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1. FROM THE BEGINNING 
Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international law has 
basically been understood as law governing the relations among 
sovereign nation states.1  With minor exceptions, such as regimes 
governing maritime commerce (the law merchant) and agreements 
regarding the treatment of religious minorities (like the mutual 
commitments of tolerance among Christian states in the Treaty of 
Westphalia itself), nation states were the major subjects of interna-
tional law.  States were autonomous, independent, and equal.  
States were governed by laws to which they all consented, in the 
form of bilateral or multilateral treaties and customary practices to 
which they acceded over time.  Positivists, such as Emmerich de 
Vattell, argued that states were bound only by such laws.2  Enlight-
enment philosophers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued that 
 
1 See LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW  xv (5th ed. 2009) 
(“[I]nternational law has been understood as the law made by states to govern re-
lations among them.”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND 
FUNCTIONS 21 (1989) (offprint from the 216 Collected Courses, (1989-IV)) (“Interna-
tional law is the normative expression of the international polity which has States 
as its basic constituent entities.”); MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (4th ed. 2011) (“An important part of international law 
has consequently had to do with the establishment of a set of mutually agreed-
upon rules respecting the nature of these states and their fundamental rights and 
obligations inter se.“).  But see BENNO TESCHKE, THE MYTH OF 1648:  CLASS, 
GEOPOLITICS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2003) (argu-
ing that this is a simplistic account of a more complicated reality). 
2 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 3 (3d ed. 2010) 
(noting that positivism viewed States as “subject to no moral authority above 
them”). 
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natural law principles should also be binding on states.  Despite 
differing views on the legitimate sources of international law, it 
was generally accepted that it governed states alone.3 
1.1.   Transformation 
The system was radically transformed after World War II.  
Stunned by the Holocaust, world leaders swore, “Never again!”4  
In that brief moment of solidarity, beginning with Articles 55 and 
56 of the UN Charter (recognizing fundamental freedoms and the 
obligations of states to respect them) and culminating in the 
International Bill of Rights,5 sovereign states recognized the human 
rights of their own people.6  These rights included civil and 
 
3 For a rousing and exhaustively documented rebuttal, see Jordan J. Paust, 
Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 977 (2011) (arguing that nonstate actors have played a significant role in 
shaping international law).  See also MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (6th ed. 2010) (“While states dominated 
consideration in the first edition [1973], that dominance is no longer warranted.”). 
4 This was the crie de coeur of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the 
drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the survivors of the 
Holocaust.  For sources on the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, see Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing military tribunals for the punishment of war criminals); 
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS:  A PERSONAL MEMOIR 
(1992) (recounting the trials of Nuremberg defendants).  For information on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(proclaiming the dignity and equality of all individuals); JOHN P. HUMPHREY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS:  A GREAT ADVENTURE (1984) (detailing the 
passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  For stories of Holocaust 
survivors, see ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT (Stella Rodway trans., Bantam Books 1982) 
(1958) (recounting Wiesel’s harrowing experience in the Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald concentration camps during the Holocaust); THE SORROW AND THE 
PITY (Télévision Rencontre Société Anonyme 1969) (interviewing survivors of the 
Nazi occupation in France). 
5 The International Bill of Rights consists of the Universal Declaration, supra 
note 4; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].  See generally The 
International Bill of Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.6, U.N. Sales No. E.02.XIV.4 
(Vol. I, Part 1) (2003), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Publications/Compilation1.1en.pdf. 
6 See, e.g., MARY ANNE GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:  ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (documenting the work 
of the commission led by Eleanor Roosevelt tasked with putting together this 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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political rights, familiar to Americans from our own Constitution, 
as well as less familiar economic, social, and cultural rights, 
including the right to health and the right to an adequate standard 
of living.  The recognition of individual human beings as subjects 
of international law was the first major sea change in international 
law from the bottom up. 
The second major change, which also followed World War II, 
was decolonization.  This change was less radical than the human 
rights idea in that it did not challenge the basic premise that states 
were the major subjects of international law.  But it was more 
radical in that it claimed statehood for former colonial territories 
that, like individuals, had never before been considered legal 
subjects.  Rather, they had been viewed as the property of the 
‘civilized’ Western states.  There were fewer than fifty states in 
1945 when the UN Charter was drafted.7  Now there are almost 
two hundred members of the United Nations.8  Few share the 
culture and history of the European states, which were the 
cornerstone of the Westphalian system.  In their histories, the 
Western states were the enemies and the oppressors.9 
The more recent members of the international system of states, 
in general, are less industrialized and poorer than the Western 
 
International Bill of Rights).  For another version of the story, see INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ITS OTHERS 2 (Anne Orford ed., 2006) (“[E]xplor[ing] international law as 
a record of attempts to think about what happens at the limit of modern political 
organization”); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:  
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 174-75 (2003) 
(explaining “at least two ways in which the Third World is displaced by the West 
and is made invisible in this historiography”). 
7 Forty-nine original states ratified the U.N. Charter and there are currently 
193 members.  See  U.N. Charter, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/CTC/uncharter-all-lang.pdf (listing original signatories).  See also 
History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/aboutun/ 
history.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (providing a brief overview of the 
formation of the United Nations, including a summary of the international 
organizations that preceded it). 
8 See UN Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/ 
unms/whatisms.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (listing the different methods in 
which the current 193 U.N. member states joined the organization).  See also 
Brigitte Stern, A Conversation with Oscar Schachter, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 343, 
343 (1997) (recounting wryly his advice to install sixty seats in the U.N. General 
Assembly during construction as one of his biggest mistakes as an international 
lawyer). 
9 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
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states.  They have been known by many different terms, including 
the “Third World,”10 the “Group of 77,”11 the “Global South,”12 and 
the “Least Developed Countries” (LDCs),13 which is the term used 
here. 
The LDCs and human rights both challenge international law 
from the bottom up.14  Both defy the political status quo.  Both seek 
 
10 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, 
Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
529, 529 n.1 (2000) (explaining his choice of the term “Third World,” which 
includes “a contingent and shifting cultural-territoriality which may encompass 
states and social movements”).  See also Gerard Chaliand, Third World: Definitions 
and Descriptions, THIRD WORLD TRAVELER,   http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/ 
General/ThirdWorld_def.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (noting that “Third 
World” is a term originally used to distinguish those nations that neither aligned 
with the West nor with the East during the Cold War); infra Part 3.1. 
11 See About the Group of 77, THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (“The Group of 77 is the 
largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United 
Nations . . . .”).  The Group of 77 was established on June 15, 1964 by the 
signatories to the Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries, issued at the end 
of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in Geneva.  Id.  While these groups overlap, membership shifts over 
time. 
12 See United Nations Dialogue with the Global South, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/globalsouth/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (describing the 
background and activities of the “UN Dialogue with the Global South,” a project 
to cultivate relationships between the U.N. and universities in developing 
nations).  See also American University Center for the Global South, AM. U., http:// 
www1.american.edu/academic.depts/acainst/cgs/about.html (last visited Mar. 
17, 2013) (“The nations of Africa, Central and Latin America, and most of Asia 
[are] collectively known as the Global South . . . .  [It] includes nearly 157 . . . 
recognized states in the world, and many have less developed or severely limited 
resources.”). 
13 According to the United Nations Office of the High Representative for 
Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island 
Developing States (U.N.-OHRLLS): 
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) represent the poorest and 
weakest segment of the international community.  Extreme poverty, 
the structural weaknesses of their economies and the lack of 
capacities related to growth, often compounded by structural 
handicaps, hamper efforts of these countries to improve the quality of 
life of their people. 
Least Developed Countries: About Least Developed Countries, U.N.-OHRLLS,  
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ohrlls/UNOHRLLS/new/en/ldc/ 
related/58/index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). 
14 As Professor Dickinson noted when reviewing this paper at the UCLA 
Research Forum, supra asterisk note, comparing the effects of a shifting group of 
states—the LDCs—with those of a shifting group of NGOs and IOs—human 
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to dilute the authority of the older sovereign states.  Both question 
the distribution of global resources.  Both generate a rich rhetoric 
of empowerment, equality, and independence. 
But there are serious tensions between these two bottom-up 
projects.  Human rights advocates point out that LDCs often deny 
the human rights of their own minorities or their own women.15  
LDCs, in turn, charge that human rights are a pretext for 
interfering with their domestic politics.  Some claim that ‘human 
rights’ are not in fact ‘universal,’ but a Western imposition.16 
At the same time, however, the LDCs and human rights remain 
interdependent.  The human rights of the world’s poorest 
populations cannot be realized, for example, if the states in which 
 
rights advocates—on an ever-evolving body of international law is dealing with 
“apples and oranges.”  Laura Dickinson, Oswald Symister Colclough Research 
Professor of Law, George Washington University, Comments at the Inaugural 
ASIL Research Forum at UCLA (Nov. 5, 2011). For international lawyers, 
however, messy realities come with the territory.  See infra Part 1.2. (describing the 
fragmentation of international law). 
15 See generally Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (providing a comprehensive database of human rights 
reports organized by country and region).  In particular within this collection, see 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: 
AFGHANISTAN 33 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/186669.pdf (noting that Afghanistan remains “a very dangerous 
country for women.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 2011: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186395.pdf (reporting ongoing 
“[s]ocietal discrimination against and abuse of women and children”); U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2011: NEPAL 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186683.pdf 
(“Discrimination against women was a problem, and citizenship laws that 
discriminate based on gender contributed to statelessness.  Domestic violence 
against women remained a serious problem, and dowry-related deaths 
occurred.”).  See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2011: THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), available at http://files.amnesty.org/air11/air_ 
2011_full_en.pdf (discussing issues related to women and minority rights per 
individual country). 
16 See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, Human Rights in the 21st Century: Take a Walk on the 
Dark Side, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 665, 674 (2006) (“Assertions about the universality of 
human rights simply deny the reality of those whom it claims to represent and 
speak for, disclaiming their histories and imposing another’s through a 
hegemonising move.”); Jiang Qing & Daniel A. Bell, A Confucian Constitution for 
China, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A25, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/07/11/opinion/a-confucian-constitution-in-china.html?_r=0 
(arguing in favor of the Confucian concept of “humane authority”). 
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they live are systematically disadvantaged by the agreements 
governing world trade.17  Nor can the LDCs expect to be treated as 
legitimate sovereign states when their human rights violations 
appall the rest of the world.18 
1.2.   Fragmentation 
Both bottom-up projects share an increasingly fragmented 
world.  During roughly the same period that LDCs and human 
rights have been emerging, international law has been dramatically 
expanding and diversifying, as set out in the Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Fragmentation of 
International Law (ILC Report).19  As set out in the ILC Report, 
fragmentation refers to several related phenomena, including: 
 
17 See Eleanor M. Fox, Globalization and Human Rights: Looking Out for the 
Welfare of the Worst Off, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 201, 211 (2002) (arguing that the 
agreements governing world trade “block the markets that the developing 
countries need to root their own economies”). 
18 See Situations and Cases, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2013) (listing cases regarding government officials from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda and Sudan 
tried or currently being tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes, 
including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide).  These cases 
include Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, at 36, Decision on Sentence 
(July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf (sentencing 
Dyilo to fourteen years imprisonment after being convicted, as co-perpetrator, of 
war crimes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo consisting of “conscripting 
and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively 
in hostilities in the context of an internal armed conflict”); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, 
Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf (alleging five counts of 
crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes and three counts of genocide 
against defendant, all occurring in Sudan); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-
02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest (July 8, 2005), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf (charging defendants with crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in Uganda including sexual enslavement, rape, attack 
against civilian population, enlisting of children and cruel treatment). 
19 Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc., 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Chairman), at 8. 
See generally Hubert Isak, The ‘Second Pillar’ in a Union without Pillars – A New 
Quality of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the Treaty of Lisbon?, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION (Isabelle 
Buffard et. al eds., 2008) (honoring by festschrift Gerhard Hafner, who initiated 
the study of fragmentation by the ILC in 2000); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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[T]he emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous 
rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of 
legal practice.  What once appeared to be governed by 
“general international law” has become the field of 
operation for such specialist systems as ”trade law“, 
”human rights law“, ”environmental law”, . . . and even 
such exotic and highly specialized knowledges as 
”investment law” or ”international refugee law” etc. ─ each 
possessing their own principles and institutions.20 
According to the ILC Report, there is concern that international 
law is losing coherence, certainty, and predictability because it 
lacks dependable mechanisms for reconciling inconsistencies.21 
This Article examines the relationship between fragmentation 
and the simultaneous bottom-up transformation of international 
law.  While this relationship is complex, it can be characterized, in 
general, as positive insofar as conflicts between wealthy, powerful 
top-down entities, such as industrialized states22 and the 
international organizations (IOs) which they control,23 and 
‘bottom-up’ human rights constituencies are concerned.  That is, in 
such contexts, these two developments reflect and reinforce each 
other.  Where top-down entities are in tension with human rights, 
fragmentation is likely to work to the advantage of the latter.  
Indeed, human rights advocates contribute to fragmentation, and 
 
Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order (N.Y.U. Law 
Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 09-04, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334289. 
20 Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 19, at 11. 
21 Id. at 12. 
22 Like the LDCs, these states have been known by several different terms, 
including the “First World,” the “West,” the “global North,” and the “civilized 
states.”  These are ‘top down,’ not necessarily in their internal organization, but in 
their relations with poorer states, or powerless constituencies within states. 
23 Andre Soliani, BRICs Said to Seek End to West’s Monopoly on Leadership of 
World Bank, IMF, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2011, 7:06 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-13/brics-said-to-seek-end-to-u-s-western-europe-
monopoly-of-world-bank-imf.html (“The management structure of the 
institutions needs to reflect changes in the world economy.”)  According to 
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa—“will insist on the fact that governance at the IMF and the World 
Bank cannot be a systematic rotation between the U.S. and Europe, with the other 
countries excluded.”  Id. 
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in some areas are largely responsible for it, for precisely this 
reason. 
Where top-down entities are in tension with LDCs, in contrast, 
fragmentation generally benefits those on top.  The proliferation of 
“legal institutions and spheres of legal practice”24 enables wealthy 
states and even non-state actors, such as multinationals, to 
outlawyer the LDCs, further marginalizing them.  Indeed, top-
down entities contribute to fragmentation, and in some areas are 
largely responsible for it, for precisely this reason. 
The thesis here is that fragmentation supports human rights 
even as it undermines LDCs.  This is a preliminary project and it is 
theoretical rather than empirical.25  My objective is to explore some 
 
24 Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 19, at 11. 
25 Although I draw on pertinent data, see, e.g., infra notes 32, 35, I prefer a 
theoretical approach here for two reasons.  First, data are largely unavailable or 
flawed for large segments of the world’s women, especially those women on the 
bottom. See, e.g., U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2010: TRENDS 
AND STATISTICS, at xii, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/19, U.N. Sales No. 
E.10.XVII.11 (2010) [hereinafter WORLD’S WOMEN 2010] (listing the impediments to 
a meaningful empirical analysis of gender).  Second, even if data were available, 
its usefulness, especially in projects like this, remains an open question.  As Hilary 
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin note: 
Empirical data, however accurate their collection and collation, reveal 
only a partial picture of any situation and may obscure the realities of 
complex social and political ordering.  In times of rapid change, 
especially in economic, social and legal matters, reliance upon such data 
can be misleading in that it lags behind subsequent developments.  
Moreover, UN concern with women-specific statistics appears to have 
peaked in 1995 . . . . 
HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 5 (2000).  See also OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 239-40 (2006) 
(acknowledging criticism of Hathaway’s methodology in analyzing the 
commitment and compliance records of nations under human rights treaties).  As 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks note more generally in their critique of Oona 
Hathaway’s statistical model for evaluating the effectiveness of human rights 
treaties: 
But because the stakes are so high, it is important that we make accurate 
connections between what the law does and what happens on the 
ground. Those connections cannot be ascertained through the research 
design that Hathaway employed. Perhaps the answer is to discard this 
type of statistical modelling [sic] and adopt a softer kind of empiricism, 
something more sociological than economic. Perhaps it’s something else. 
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 183 (2003).  But see Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The 
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of the effects of the fragmentation of international law on its 
bottom-up transformation and to suggest some of the possibilities, 
as well as the limits, of that transformation in the process. 
Part 2 of this Article examines the effects of the fragmentation 
of international law on women’s human rights.  Part 3 describes 
the impact of fragmentation on LDCs.  Part 4 draws on the 
frameworks developed in the first two parts to analyze the effects 
when the two coincide; that is, the effects of fragmentation on 
women’s human rights in LDCs. 
Both the limits and the possibilities of fragmentation have been 
brought into sharp relief by the recent global economic crisis.26  A 
rising tide may or may not lift all boats, but when the tide is out it 
is clear who is left high and dry.27  While “the global recession, 
contrary to economists’ expectations, did not increase poverty in 
the developing world,”28 it certainly didn’t help.  There has been a 
small drop in the number of people living below $2 per day, but 
“[t]he number of people living between $1.25 and $2 has almost 
doubled from 648 million to 1.18 billion between 1981 and 2008.”29  
 
Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 19-25 (2012) 
(noting the importance of empirical work in human rights scholarship). 
26 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 63/303, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/303 (July 13, 2009) 
(addressing the issues caused by the world financial and economic crisis) 
[hereinafter U.N. Resolution on World Economic Crisis]; infra note 271 (setting out 
the World Bank’s predictions for women).  But see, e.g., Hanna Rosin, The End of 
Men, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-end-of-men/308135/ (“[F]or the first time in 
human history . . . . the global economy is evolving in a way that is eroding a 
historical preference for male children, worldwide.”). 
27 The most recent report from the World Bank, somewhat surprising, 
“shows a broad reduction in extreme poverty.”  Annie Lowrey, Extreme Poverty in 
Developing World is Down Despite the Recession, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2012 
at A4.  This decrease may simply reflect the fact that the world’s poorest had no 
jobs, housing, savings, benefits, or pensions to lose.  As the Bank notes, moreover, 
“[l]ags in data availability mean that 2008 is the most recent year we can make a 
reliable global estimate . . . .”  SHAOHUA CHEN & MARTIN RAVALLION, AN UPDATE 
TO THE WORLD BANK’S ESTIMATES OF CONSUMPTION POVERTY 1 (Mar. 1, 2012), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVCALNET/Resources/ 
Global_Poverty_Update_2012_02-29-12.pdf.  Nor does the data reflect intra-
household distribution, which overwhelmingly favors males.  See, e.g., WORLD’S 
WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, passim (providing several statistics to illustrate 
different aspects of general population patterns). 
28 Lowrey, supra note 27. 
29 Chen & Ravallion, supra note 27, at 3.  Many question the usefulness of 
GNP or per capita expenditure as meaningful indicators.  See, e.g., MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5-6 
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The benefits of additional laws, fora, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other mechanisms for furthering 
women’s human rights usually fail to offset the costs of living in an 
LDC. 
But the fragmentation of international law is an ongoing pro-
cess, and women’s human rights in LDCs are far from a lost cause.  
Indeed, as journalists Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn pro-
claim, “[It] is the . . . cause of our time.”30  Legal scholar Dianne Ot-
to is less blunt, but no less provocative:  “[F]eminist engagement 
with human rights law . . . has barely begun and it is hard to pre-
dict what new opportunities and insights will emerge.”31  
2. HOW FRAGMENTATION AFFECTS WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
This Part analyzes the relationship between the structural and 
normative transformation of international law in the context of 
women’s human rights.  There are three reasons for this focus.  
First, regrettably (if conveniently for my purposes here), women 
are at the bottom in virtually every state, by virtually any indicator.  
They are poorer, both in terms of income and wealth;32 they have 
less political power;33 and, despite their general exclusion from 
armed combat,34 they are overwhelmingly more likely to be victims 
of violence.35  They are also at the bottom of virtually any minority 
group recognized in human rights law.36  
 
(2006) (setting out an alternative to GNP that focuses on “human capabilities . . . 
what people are actually able to do and be”). 
30 Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, The Women’s Crusade, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Aug. 23, 2009, at 28. 
31 Dianne Otto, Lost in Translation: Re-scripting the Sexed Subjects of 
International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 318, supra 
note 6, at 356.  See also MARILOU MCPHEDRAN ET AL., THE FIRST CEDAW IMPACT 
STUDY: FINAL REPORT 9 (2000) [hereinafter FIRST CEDAW IMPACT STUDY] 
(proclaiming that the Report is the first “grass roots study of [CEDAW]” and “just 
the beginning” of research in this area). 
32 Women perform 66% of the world’s work, but they earn only 10% of the 
world’s income, and own merely 1% of the world’s property.  Facts and Figures on 
Women, Poverty and Economics, U.N. DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN,  http://web.archive 
.org/web/20091022132333/http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_pov
erty_economics/facts_figures.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
33 WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, at 112-120. 
34 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 258. 
35 The roughly 163 million missing women is a population made up by 
aborted female fetuses or victims of female infanticide.  See U.N. Population Fund, 
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Second, women’s human rights have generated a substantial 
jurisprudence,37 including multiple fora in which their claims may 
be raised.  This context, accordingly, provides plentiful examples 
of the fragmentation of international law.  Third, and finally, 
women comprise roughly half the global population,38 giving my 
argument substantive heft.  While I do not claim that my thesis 
holds true in all contexts, if it is persuasive here, it should not be 
dismissed as trivial. 
2.1.   Women’s Rights 
‘Human’ rights, of course, include the rights of women as well 
as the rights of men.  Women, like men, are entitled to all of the 
protections and assurances set out in the International Bill of 
 
4th Asia Pacific Conference on Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights, Oct. 
29-31, 2007, Sex-Ratio Imbalance in Asia:  Trends, Consequences and Policy Responses: 
Executive Summary 1, available at http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/ 
studies/summaries/reg_exe_summary.pdf (explaining that women are not 
included in mortality statistics, moreover, which are accordingly skewed).  See also 
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 218 (“The Human Rights Committee, 
for example, has outlined the scope of the right to life without reference to the 
issue of female infanticide, although more recently its comments on states’ reports 
indicate a broader approach.”). 
36 See, e.g., Forum on Minority Issues: Guaranteeing the Rights of Minority 
Women, Nov. 29, 2011, Empowering Minority Women to Claim Their Rights: 
Identifying Effective Practices, U.N. OHCHR (“[M]inority women face double or 
intersectional discrimination . . . .”). 
37 As noted above, however, this jurisprudence should still be considered to 
be in its early stages.  See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 120 
(proposing sexual equality and reproductive equality for inclusion in a revised list 
of jus cogens norms); supra note 31. 
38 There are 57 million more men than women.  WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra 
note 25, at vii.  See World Population, INSTITUT NATIONAL D’ÉTUDES DÉMOGRAPHIQUES, 
http://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/faq/theme_1/bdd/q_tex
t/are_there_more_men_or_more_women_in_the_world_/question/53/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2013) (stating that the number of men and women in the world is 
roughly equal, though men hold a slight lead with 102 men for 100 women, as of 
2010).  See also World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision: Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://esa.un.org/ 
unpd/wpp/Other-Information/faq.htm#q4  (explaining in question four that 
Oct. 31, 2011 “is a symbolic date” because it is when the world population will 
reach roughly 7 billion).  But see U.N. Population Fund, supra note 35 (noting “a 
dramatic increase” in the proportion of males to females in Asia and concluding 
that “if the continent’s overall sex ratio was the same as elsewhere in the world, in 
2005 Asia’s population would have included almost 163 million more women and 
girls”). 
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Rights.39  Nondiscrimination has been a cornerstone of 
international human rights since 1948 and the Universal 
Declaration, the Civil Covenant, and the Economic Covenant all 
bar discrimination on the basis of sex.40  Women are even singled 
out for special treatment in Article 10 of the Economic Covenant, 
which assures mothers special protections while pregnant and 
after giving birth.41 
Feminists argued that existing human rights were inadequate, 
however, for two reasons.42  First, as a practical matter, women in 
 
39 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 4. 
40 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 2.2 (“The States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present 
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to . . . sex . . . .”); 
id. art. 3 (“The State Parties . . .  ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present 
Covenant.”); id. art. 7(a)(i) (“[R]ecogniz[ing] the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work . . . [including] fair wages 
and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, 
in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those 
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work”); CCPR Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Woman (Article 3), 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) (“The full effect of this 
provision is impaired whenever any person is denied the full and equal 
enjoyment of any right.  Consequently, State should ensure to men and women 
equally the enjoyment of all  rights provided for in th[is] Covenant.”); Otto, supra 
note 31, at 349 (describing the ICCPR rights as “reimagin[ed] . . . as a woman”).  
But see Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, General Comment N. 16, Article 
3: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 3, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc E/C.12/2005/3 (May 13, 2005) (“Substantive 
equality for men and women will not be achieved simply through the enactment 
of laws or the adoption of policies that are gender-neutral on their face. . . . States 
parties should take into account that such laws, policies and practice can fail to 
address or even perpetuate inequality between men and women, because they do 
not take account of existing economic, social and cultural inequalities . . . .”); 
Montréal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 
760 (2004) (noting deep disagreement about the nature of gender equality). 
41 ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 10.2 (“Special protection should be accorded to 
mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth.  During such 
period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate 
social security benefits.”). 
42 Important early examples of the burgeoning scholarship on women’s 
human rights include:  HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); 
NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
(1983); RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda 
Dallmeyer ed., 1993); 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  (Kelly D.  
Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999); WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS (Julie 
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fact remain second-class citizens, subordinated throughout the 
world,43 despite their equal treatment in these foundational human 
rights instruments. 
Second, from a more theoretical perspective, feminists exposed 
the gendered assumptions of human rights discourse itself.  
Human rights law incorporates a male perspective, they argued; it 
focuses on issues or problems that affect men more than women, or 
that affect men differently than they affect women.  Rights, 
historically, are claims of the citizen against the state.  But citizens, 
historically, were male and their claims reflected the interests, 
concerns, and social reality of men.  In Aristotle’s polis, men alone 
were citizens, and therefore rights-holders.44  Civil rights, such as 
the right to freedom of expression, assume a capacity for 
participation in public life and for moving about freely in the 
world, that historically, and in much of the contemporary world,45 
has little relation to women’s experience. 
2.2.   Fragmentation of the Law 
Women’s rights became a focus of international law in the 
1990s.46  Faced with the dearth of law addressing women’s 
 
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Arvonne S. Fraser, Becoming Human:  The 
Origins and Development of Women’s Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 853 (1999). 
43 See supra notes 32–36. 
44 D. BRENDAN NAGLE, THE HOUSEHOLD AS THE FOUNDATION OF ARISTOTLE’S 
POLIS (2006).  As Brenda Cossman further explains, “citizenship has always been 
sexed.”  Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens:  Freedom, Vibrators, and Belonging, in 
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 289, 290 (Linda C. 
McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009). 
45 See, e.g., Caryle Murphy, Saudi Women Demand Driving Rights, GLOBAL POST 
(June 15, 2011), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-
east/saudi-arabia/110615/saudi-womens-rights-driving-rights (“[T]he driving 
ban is increasingly upsetting Saudi women, who now make up more than half of 
the country’s university students.  Graduating in record numbers, they are 
looking for jobs and they want to drive themselves to work, to the shopping mall, 
to the grocery store and to their children’s schools.”).  See also Abdullah Qazi, The 
Plight of the Afghan Woman, AFGHANISTAN ONLINE (last updated Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.afghan-web.com/woman/ (noting the remnants of the Taliban rule 
under which women were forbidden to work or leave the house without a male 
escort). 
46 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT 159 (2d ed. 2000).  Steiner and Alston contend that, prior to the 1990s, 
“[o]f the several blind spots in the early development of the human rights 
movement, none is as striking as that movement’s failure to give to violations of 
women’s (human) rights the attention . . . that they require.”  Id. at 158.  This is not 
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experience, women’s advocates sought empirical data to 
substantiate that experience.47  They also demanded the 
disaggregation of existing data on the basis of sex.  They pressed 
for new laws on multiple fronts, including human rights and 
humanitarian law, expanded interpretations of existing law, and 
new fora in which to present these new claims. 
The well-known lacunae in international law—the absence of 
an international ‘Supreme Court,’48 an international legislature, 
and an international executive49─ have been recognized as a major 
factor in its fragmentation.50  These lacunae have also been a boon 
for women’s human rights.  First, the absence of these institutions 
means that there are many fewer male-dominated institutions to 
gain access to, and transform.51  Second, as Anne Orford points 
 
to suggest that they were ignored.  For an account of the long years of hard work 
by the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), created in 1946, see Barbara 
Stark, Women’s Rights, in 5 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 341, 344–49 
(David Forsythe ed., 2009). 
47 See, e.g., MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED 74–91 (1988) (noting that 
women’s work is economically invisible, not appearing in national statistics). 
48 The decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have no 
precedential value.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  The decisions of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are similarly ad hoc.  See 
generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, at art 1. 
(May 3, 1993), annexed to Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 
2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY 
Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, art. 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
[hereafter ICTR Statute]. 
49 See BEDERMAN, supra note 2, at 9 (positing that if international law was 
comprised of its own executive, legislature, and judiciary, it would be 
transformed into “World Government” which is “the antithesis of international 
law”); LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 7 (2d ed. 
1979) (asserting the need to analyze “‘the system’” which is the international legal 
community, to understand how nations use law in the context of international 
relations). 
50 See Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 19, at 10 
(noting the absence of legislature). 
51 For a rigorous comparative analysis of German and European Community 
political quotas, see ANNE PETERS, WOMEN, QUOTAS AND CONSTITUTIONS 221–25, 
254–55 (1999). 
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out, it affords “space amongst rules and institutions in which to 
discover ‘opportunities for political engagement.’”52 
Third, the peculiarities of international lawmaking are useful 
for feminists for some of the same reasons that they are conducive 
to fragmentation.  International lawmaking, while difficult and 
contentious,53 often develops simultaneously on multiple fronts.  
As a corollary, consensus is not a prerequisite.  Unlike statutes, for 
example, treaties are binding only on those states that choose to 
adhere to them.  So a relatively radical instrument, like the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“Women’s Convention” or “CEDAW”),54 can be 
drafted because, unlike a domestic statute, it does not require the 
participation of those who oppose it from the beginning. 55 
 
52 Anne Orford, A Jurisprudence of the Limit, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
OTHERS 1, supra note 6, at 16–17 (citing DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: 
REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 131 (2004)). 
53 Indeed, international lawmaking is often so contentious that no law is 
made at all; in many areas there are more gaps than law.  The growing body of 
international law on reproductive rights, for example, does not directly address 
the issue of abortion.  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, infra note 54, does not ensure the right to 
abortion, reflecting the lack of consensus among states.  See, e.g., Conseil 
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 18030, Jan. 15, 1975, JCP 
II (Fr.) (upholding France’s abortion law as consistent with art. 2 of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).  See generally Law No. 239 of 
24 March 1970 on the Interruption of Pregnancy, as amended by Law No. 564 of 
19 July 1978 and Law No. 572 of 12 July 1985 (Fin.), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Finland.abo.htm 
(permitting, in Finland, abortions under certain conditions); Florian Miedel, Is 
West Germany’s 1975 Abortion Decision a Solution to the American Abortion Debate?:  
A Critique of Mary Ann Glendon and Donald Kommers, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 471 (1993) (discussing a 1975 West German court decision which struck 
down a law that failed to criminalize abortions in first trimester).  Finland’s 
restrictive laws reflect its “more conservative culture,” despite its “common legal 
heritage and close ties with Sweden.”  David Bradley, Convergence in Family Law:  
Mirrors, Transplants and Political Economy, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 127, 
134 (1999). 
54 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193-
98 (Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW] (creating CEDAW and describing its 
powers). 
55 While states may choose to participate in order to exercise a moderating 
influence on the drafters, as Beth Simmons has shown, participation may have 
unintended consequences.  See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 237 (2009) (explaining that “Japan’s 
efforts during negotiations were minimal, and largely directed toward softening 
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Feminists have also drawn on the unique characteristics of 
customary international law (CIL)56 to further women’s rights.57  
CIL provides a process through which “soft law,” that is, ‘law’ that 
is precatory or aspirational, rather than legally binding, can 
‘harden’ over time, and become legally binding.  States may 
persistently dissent from CIL, and thereby exempt themselves from 
its coverage.58  However, their failure to do so may leave them 
bound to norms, such as the norm against domestic violence, that 
they might have preferred to ignore.59 
2.2.1.  Multiple Laws 
In addition to the prohibitions on discrimination cited above,60 
several human rights instruments explicitly focus on women.  In 
 
the treaty’s language and reducing its scope” and describing Japan’s eventual 
ratification, without reservations). 
56 Treaties and custom are the two major sources of international law.  See ICJ 
Statute, supra note 48, art. 38 (directing the ICJ to apply treaties and custom, 
among other sources, when resolving international disputes). For examples of 
scholars who are skeptical about custom’s capacity to bind, see generally Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: 
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current 
Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997).  
But see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (refuting the arguments put forth by Bradley and 
Goldsmith). CIL has also evoked protest from new states that chafe at being 
bound by law that they had no role in making.  See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The 
Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 465 (2000) (discussing 
the difficulty in determining if states have accepted international law norms and 
the reasons for states’ reluctance to adopt these laws). 
57 This is hardly to suggest that CIL always benefits women. See 
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 45 (noting that the customary norm 
against discrimination, for example, is much weaker in the context of gender than 
race).   
58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102 cmt. d (1987) (noting that states that dissent while law is still in the process 
of development are not bound by that law). 
59 See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Transnational Culture:  
Regulating Gender Violence Through Global Law, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 53, 56 (2006) 
(“[B]ecause gender violence is deeply embedded in systems of kinship, religion, 
warfare, and nationalism, its prevention requires major social changes in 
communities, families, and nations.”). 
60 See supra notes 39–41. 
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1967, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)61 drafted the 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,62 and in 1974, the legally binding Women’s 
Convention was drafted.63  It was adopted by the General 
Assembly in 197964 and came into force in 1981.65 CEDAW 
addresses women’s actual subordination as well as the gendered 
assumptions of human rights law.66  First, CEDAW requires States 
Parties to address discrimination in fact as well as in law, including 
in discriminatory “social and cultural patterns of conduct.”67  
Second, CEDAW authorizes “temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality”; that is, the state may take temporary 
affirmative measures to level the playing field to compensate for 
historical discrimination.68  Third, CEDAW explicitly addresses 
reproduction and reproductive work, requiring state support for 
both and further requiring states to educate men regarding their 
responsibility for reproductive work.69 
In addition to CEDAW, instruments focusing on women 
include: the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,70 the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women,71 the Convention on 
 
61 See supra note 46. 
62 See Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. 
Res. 2263, U.N. Doc A/RES/2263 (Nov. 7, 1967), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f05938.html (stating policies 
against all forms of gender discrimination).   
63 See CEDAW, supra note 54. 
64 See Marsha A. Freeman, Women: Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, in 5 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 46, at 331 (noting that the adoption was “in time for a signing ceremony at 
the opening of the Second World Conference on Women held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, in 1980”). 
65 See CEDAW, supra note 54. 
66 See supra Part 2.1.  
67 See CEDAW, supra note 54, art. 5. 
68 See id., art. 4 (authorizing temporary affirmative measures by States). 
69 See id., art. 5(b) (requiring states “[t]o ensure that family education includes 
a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of a 
common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of 
their children”). 
70 G.A. Res. 54/4, annex, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (Vol. I), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
71 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 
1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7, 1954). 
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Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages,72 and the Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women.73  The International Criminal Court (ICC),74 as well as the 
ad hoc criminal tribunals, all address women’s rights.75  The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank)76 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),77 while 
notably less proactive, also address gender.  The World Bank has a 
policy,78 procedure,79 strategy,80 and action plan81 on gender, 
although critics note that “actual efforts to engender investments 
are fairly weak and projects and policies often make impoverished 
 
72 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration for Marriages, adopted Nov. 7, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into 
force Dec. 9, 1964).  
73 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, G.A. Res. 1040 (XI), 
(Aug. 11, 1958). 
74 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 54(1)(b) (entered into force July 1, 2002) (“The Prosecutor 
shall . . . respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, 
including . . . gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3 . . . and take into account 
the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves . . . gender violence . . . .”). 
75 See infra text accompanying notes 93–101 (describing the process through 
which rape became recognized as a war crime). 
76 See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S 134 (listing the 
purposes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 
77 See generally Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. 
I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (outlining the purposes of the International 
Monetary Fund). 
78 See generally The World Bank, Gender and Development, BP 4.20, in THE 
WORLD BANK OPERATIONS MANUAL 1 (Mar. 2003) (stating the World Bank’s policy 
objectives). 
79 See generally The World Bank Gender and Development Policy Framework—A 
Guidance Note, THE WORLD BANK (2003), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTGENDER/0,,contentMDK:22550450~pagePK:210058~p
iPK:210062~theSitePK:336868,00.html (evaluating the World Bank’s procedures 
for resolving gender issues). 
80 See generally THE WORLD BANK, INTEGRATING GENDER INTO THE WORLD 
BANK’S WORK: A STRATEGY FOR ACTION (2002) (explaining the World Bank’s 
strategies for implementing policies to counter gender issues). 
81 See generally THE WORLD BANK, GENDER EQUALITY AS SMART ECONOMICS: A 
WORLD BANK GROUP GENDER ACTION PLAN (2006) (planning responses to gender 
issues confronting the World Bank). 
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women worse off.”82  The IMF has “confirm[ed] their commitment 
to gender equality,” although it has no actual policy on gender.83  
Commitments to ‘mainstreaming’ have become ubiquitous,84 if 
ambiguous.85  Women are also the subjects of innumerable soft law 
initiatives, including the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).86 
Although rights discourse historically neglected women’s 
concerns,87 feminists have shown how rights can be transformed.  
The recognition of violence against women, including domestic 
violence,88 as a violation of women’s human rights provides an 
instructive example.  Historically, most violence against women 
was not viewed as a violation of women’s human rights because it 
was not perpetuated by the state.  Rather, it was considered 
‘private,’ ‘natural,’ or ‘cultural.’  Women’s groups brought the 
issue of violence against women to international attention.89  The 
 
82  CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL LAW (CIEL), GENDER JUSTICE: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
GENDER ACCOUNTABILITY AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (2007), 
available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/GenderJustice_Jun07.pdf. 
83 Id. at 5.  The Guidance Note for Fund Staff mentions gender, but “gender” is 
omitted from the other five Guidance Notes.  Id. 
84 See also United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, 
Report on the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Framework for 
Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2,  Feb. 2, 1996, available at http://193.194.138.190/ 
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/0a7aa1c3f8de6f9a802566d700530914. 
85 See Nicholas Piálek, Is This Really the End of the Road for Gender 
Mainstreaming?  Getting to Grips with Gender and Institutional Change, in CAN 
NGO’S MAKE A DIFFERENCE?  THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES 279, 
281 (Antony J. Bebbington et al. eds., 2008) (“[T]ransition from gender-rich policy 
to gender-poor practice is frequently cited as an example of policy evaporation . . . 
.”).  See also Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming 
and Human Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 13 (2005) (“[The 
‘mainstreaming’] policy has served to justify the reduction of resources for 
specialized women’s units within U.N. agencies.”). 
86 See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS REPORT 2011 20-23 (Lois Jenson, ed.), U.N. Sales No. E.11.I.10 
(2011), available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/11_MDG%20Report_ 
EN.pdf (proclaiming the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of 
women as the third Millennium Development Goal). 
87 See supra Part 2.1. 
88 See Merry, supra note 59, at 56 (describing the effects of recognition of 
domestic violence as a human rights violation). 
89 See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 165–198 (1998) 
(explaining the swift and recent development of transnational networks on 
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three World Conferences on Women organized in connection with 
the UN Decade for Woman between 1975 and 1985 provided fora.90  
Some women’s groups lobbied for recognition of rape as a war 
crime.91  Others urged the international community to mobilize 
against female genital surgeries (FGS).92  Still others focused on 
domestic violence.93  Their work culminated in the 1993 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,94 
which recognizes that violence against women both violates and 
“impairs or nullifies [women’s] enjoyment of [human] rights and 
freedoms.”95 
This was not binding law, but it was a crucial step toward 
binding law.  The appointment of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, added to the 
momentum.  Coomaraswamy launched a series of fact-finding 
missions and her office prepared over two dozen reports on 
violence against women.96  Though CEDAW does not explicitly 
 
violence against women); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International 
Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 387 (1999) (noting efforts of women’s organizations in 
influencing international tribunals to recognize “fuller responses to sexual 
violence”). 
90 See generally Rep. of the World Conference to Review & Appraise the 
Achievements of the U.N. Decade for Women: Equality, Dev. & Peace, Nairobi, 
Kenya June 15–26, 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 
E.85.IV.10 (1985); Rep. of the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women: 
Equality, Dev. & Peace, Copenhagen, Den., July 14–30, 1980, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.94/35, U.N. Sales No. E.80.IV.3 (1980); Rep. of the World Conference of 
the Int’l Women’s Year, Mexico City, Mex., June 19–July 2, 1975, U.N. Doc. 
E/CONF.66/34, U.N. Sales No. E.76.IV.1 (1976). 
91 See U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Women and Violence, U.N. Doc. 
DPI/1772/HR (Feb. 1996), http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1772e.htm  (stating 
that the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women 
declared that rape in armed conflict is a war crime and could, under certain 
circumstances, be considered genocide); infra text accompanying notes 93–100. 
92 See Legislation and Other National Provisions, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/fgm-prov.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (describing 
the organization’s efforts to “systematically . . . gather information on the current 
state legislation and other national provisions dealing directly or indirectly with 
the issue of female genital mutilation”). 
93 According to Keck and Sikkink, the first comprehensive survey of U.N. 
research on the subject was Violence Against Women in the Family, Sales No. 
E.89.IV.5. (1989).  KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 89, at 179 n.51. 
94 G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104, (Dec. 20, 1993). 
95 Id. ¶ 5. 
96 See, e.g., Fifth South Asia Regional Ministerial Conference, Celebrating 
Beijing Plus Ten, Islamabad, Pak., May 3-5, 2005, The Varied Contours of Violence 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
01_STARK REVISEDDOCX (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:25 PM 
708 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:4 
 
prohibit violence against women, in General Recommendation No. 
19, the Committee explained that gender-based violence is a form of 
discrimination and therefore included in CEDAW’s bar against 
gender discrimination in general.97  Now, a state’s acquiescence or 
failure to take effective measures to combat domestic violence, 
FGS, or wartime rape, is recognized as a violation of women’s 
human rights.98 
Women’s rights advocates similarly transformed humanitarian 
law by demanding the inclusion of rape as a war crime in the 
statutes of the international war crimes tribunals.  As Patricia 
Viseur Sellers notes, “The issuance of sound, reasoned sexual 
assault jurisprudence is an acknowledged achievement of the 
ICTY.”99  Historically, rape was viewed as a ‘private act’ and an 
inevitable part of war.100  Even early recognition of rape as a war 
crime focused on rape as a crime against “the husband’s 
‘honor’”.101  Women’s advocates argued that rape was a crime 
 
Against Women in South Asia, available at http://www.pangeaonlus.org/ 
download/mappamondo/dossier/DSS_Conferenza_2005_05_VariousContourVio
lence.pdf (presenting Coomaraswamy’s report on the particular cultural and 
religious practices that exacerbate the problem of violence against women in 
South Asia). 
97 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), http://www 
.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (“Gender-
based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under 
human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the 
Convention.”). 
98 See S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008) (“Notes that 
rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime 
against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide [and] stresses the 
need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the 
context of conflict resolution processes. . . .”)(emphasis omitted). 
99 Patricia Viseur Sellers, Individual(s’) Liability for Collective Sexual Violence, in 
GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153, 155 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).  At the time of 
writing, Sellers was the Legal Advisor for Gender-related Crimes and trial 
attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor for the ICTY.  Id. at 153. 
100 Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against 
Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 220 (2000) (explaining 
the “trivializ[ation]” of rape during war). 
101 Id. at 220–221 (“[A]s rape was in the Hague Convention of 1907 and the 
Geneva Conventions, it was implicitly so, categorized as an offence against ‘family 
honour and rights’ or as ‘outrages against personal dignity’ or ‘humiliating and 
degrading treatment’.  The Fourth Geneva Convention called for ‘protect[ion] 
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against the woman herself even if her husband was its intended 
target.102  This understanding of rape was subsequently clarified in 
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,103 
the Rwandan Tribunal in the Akayesu case,104 and in the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.105 
2.2.2.  Multiple Fora 
Women’s advocates have not only generated new laws but 
have also expanded the available fora in which claims arising 
under these new laws may be addressed.  In addition to the 
 
against [rape as an] ... attack on their honour,’ but rape was not treated as 
violence, and was therefore not named in the list of ‘grave breaches’ subject to the 
universal obligation to prosecute.”). 
102 Id.  
103 See ICTR Statute, supra note 48, art. 3 (“The International Tribunal for 
Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for [rape] when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. . . .”).  See also 
Marlise Simons, U.N. Court, for First Time, Defines Rape as War Crime, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/28/world/un-court-for-first-
time-defines-rape-as-war-crime.html (detailing the United Nations tribunal 
announcement of the indictment of eight Bosnian Serb military and police officers 
in connection with rapes of Muslim women in the Bosnian war, marking the first 
time sexual assault has been treated separately as a crime of war). 
104 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 685–95, 730–
34 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, 
degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a 
person.  Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact 
constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.”). 
105 See Rome Statute, supra note 74, art. 7(1) (“For the purpose of this Statute, 
‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack: . . . [r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity. . . .”).  See also WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, 
GENDER REPORT CARD ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2010 (Nov. 2010), 
available at http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/GRC10-WEB-11-10-v4_Final-
version-Dec.pdf (assessing the implementation by the ICC of the Rome Statute, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes and, in particular, the 
gender mandates they embody); The International Criminal Court: Fact Sheet 7—
Ensuring Justice for Women, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2005), http:// 
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR40/006/2005/en/73581868-d50c-11dd-
8a23-d58a49c0d652/ior400062005en.html (proclaiming the Rome Statute as “a 
model of international best practice for national legal systems to follow”). 
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international tribunals noted above,106 these include regional 
courts,107 such as the European Court of Human Rights108 and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights,109 and the hearings of the 
human rights treaty committees,110 as well as national courts.111  
 
106 See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text (describing recognition of 
rape as a war crime by the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC); Rome Statute, supra note 
74. 
107 See, e.g., Rachel A. Cichowski, Women’s Rights, the European Court, and 
Supranational Constitutionalism, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 489 (2004) (focusing on how the 
European Court of Justice influenced the development and creation of women’s 
rights, such as integrating with other governments, limiting jurisdiction, and 
engaging advocates). 
108 See, e.g., A, B & C v. Ireland, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2032 (holding that Ireland 
had failed to implement the constitutional right to a legal abortion in violation of 
Article 8’s guarantee of the right to respect for private and family life). 
109  See Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
216 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos 
/articulos/seriec_216_esp.pdf (finding Mexican military officers responsible for 
the rape and torture of Ms. Rosendo Cantú and her daughter, and, among other 
sanctions, ordering the Mexican government to conduct a thorough investigation 
of the case, adopt several legislative reforms, and pay for the victims’ medical and 
psychological treatment), Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.corteidh 
.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_215_esp.pdf (making similar findings against 
the Mexican military as in the Rosendo Cantú case).  See, e.g., Carson Osberg, 
Inter-American Court Holds that Mexico Violated the Human Rights of Two Women 
Raped by Mexican Military Personnel, THE HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://hrbrief.org/2010/11/inter-american-court-holds-that-mexico-violated-the-
human-rights-of-two-women-raped-by-mexican-military-personnel/ (concluding 
that the Mexican military justice system is inherently unsuited to investigate 
human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by members of armed forces). 
110 See, e.g., Vertido v. Philippines, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 
(Sept. 1, 2010) (finding that the Philippines violated its obligations under the Op-
tional Protocol to protect against gender-based stereotypes after a judgment is-
sued in a rape case). 
111 See Bhe v. Magistrate, 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding 
unconstitutional the sections of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 which 
excluded women from inheriting property in the light of South Africa’s 
obligations under CEDAW); McBain v. Victoria (2000) 99 FCR 1009 (Austl.) 
(holding that a state act preventing a doctor from performing in vitro fertilization 
was unlawful since its wording was inconsistent with CEDAW); see also Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers, (2000)  3 S.C.C. 224  (India) (holding that 
CEDAW article 11, which governs marriage and maternity, must  be read into 
employment contracts in India); Roches v. Wade, Action No. 132 (S. Ct. of Belize 
2004) available at http://www.belizelaw.org/supreme_court/judgements/ 
2004/sc/civil/132_of_2004.pdf (holding that Belize had an affirmative duty to 
eliminate discrimination against unmarried pregnant women as a signatory to 
CEDAW); Humaira v. Khokhar, (1999) 2 CHRLD 273 (High Ct. of Lahore) (Pak.) 
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2.3.  More and Less 
More laws and more fora do not necessarily mean that more 
women are enjoying more rights.  Indeed, the proliferation of law 
and fora could be diversionary, sapping resources better focused 
on a smaller range of targets.112  Nor do improvements in women’s 
literacy or employment, or even in domestic family laws, 
necessarily mean that women are enjoying greater rights.  Globally, 
women’s labor force participation during the past twenty years has 
increased compared to that of men, for example, but this difference 
may be more attributable to a decline in men’s labor force 
participation during that same period.113  While half of the 
countries worldwide meet the international standard for maternity 
leave, similarly, there is a persistent gap between law and 
practice.114 
The issue is complicated and the data are mixed, as the authors 
of The First CEDAW Impact Study readily acknowledge:  “We have 
used stories, research, statistics, reports, local, regional and world 
conferences, and a myriad of indicators to assist in this critical task.  
A multidimensional, multifaceted approach is needed—as diverse 
as the lives and experiences of women.”115  The contributors to The 
World’s Women 2010,116 similarly, recognize the methodological 
challenges in producing global assessments where there is little 
agreement regarding measurement standards or methods.  The 
extent to which improvement, if any, can be attributed to 
fragmentation compounds the problem. 
Yet both The First CEDAW Impact Study and The World’s Women, 
along with other recent studies, show real progress in some areas, 
such as declining gender disparities in youth literacy rates,117 a 
 
(holding that a coerced marriage is not lawful in the light of article 16 of CEDAW 
that Pakistan as a signatory abides by). 
112 See Charlesworth, Not Waving, supra note 85 (explaining how 
‘mainstreaming’ detracts from women’s agencies at the U.N.). 
113 WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, at 75-77. 
114 Id. at 75. 
115 Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Introduction, in FIRST CEDAW IMPACT 
STUDY 11, supra note 31, at 11. 
116 WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, at xii. 
117 Id. at viii. 
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decline in material mortality rates,118 and the decline of FGS.119  In 
higher income countries, women’s human rights are increasingly 
relied upon in a range of contexts.  In Germany, for example, 
women have drawn on multiple laws and fora, including 
European Community Directives, and anti-discrimination 
legislation in the United Kingdom and the former German 
Democratic Republic, to promote non-discriminatory labor 
legislation, recognition of child-rearing, and abortion legislation.120 
At the same time, however, women in lower income countries 
show a troubling lack of progress.  Women comprise roughly sixty 
to eighty percent of the export manufacturing workforce in the 
developing world, a sector the World Bank believes is being hard 
hit during the economic crisis.121  In Arab states, fewer than one 
third of women are in the labor force.122  In sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, eighty percent of women workers are in ‘vulnerable 
employment;’ that is, low income jobs with few rights.123 
As demonstrated in The World’s Women 2010, moreover, women 
bear the brunt of poverty in poor households.124  In Pakistan and 
Yemen, for example, girls in the poorest quintile are far more likely 
to leave primary school than boys.125  Where households lack 
access to clean water and energy, similarly, women do most of the 
additional work and suffer most of the harmful health effects.126 
 
118 Denise Grady, Maternal Deaths in Sharp Decline Across the Globe, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 14, 2010, at A1 (citing study in The Lancet showing a “significant drop 
worldwide in the number of women dying each year from pregnancy and 
childbirth, to about 342,900 in 2008 from 526,300 in 1980.”). 
119 WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, at x. 
120 FIRST CEDAW IMPACT STUDY, supra note 31, at 19.  See also Janet Benshoof, 
How International Law Could Radically Change the Definition of Gender Equality in the 
United States: CEDAW and Reproductive Rights, in GLOBAL JUSTICE CENTER WHITE 
PAPER SERIES: “NEW VISIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
2008” 1 (2008) (highlighting differences between international and U.S. 
interpretations of abortion cases and international courts citing CEDAW in 
striking down laws criminalizing abortion). 
121 U.N. WOMEN, supra note 32. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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3. HOW FRAGMENTATION AFFECTS LDCS 
The fragmentation of international law, especially the 
proliferation of specialized topics and fora set out in the ILC 
Report, has had a substantial impact on LDCs.  This Part first 
explains how fragmentation has affected their self-definition.  
Second, it analyzes the impact of multiple, uncoordinated 
international regimes on the LDCs, including the ‘development’ 
and free trade regimes.127  Third, this Part concludes with a few 
examples of the growing body of legal doctrine that keeps LDCs on 
the defensive. 
3.1.  Political Frames 
The fragmentation of international law reflects and reinforces 
the political fragmentation of the LDCs themselves, from a 
relatively monolithic ‘Third World,’128 to the less unified but still 
intact ‘Group of 77’ (‘G-77’),129 to the factionalized ‘LDCs,’130 
defined by bureaucrats, competing with each other for a sliver of a 
rapidly shrinking pie.  The Third World emerged from the former 
European colonies.  As David Bederman explains, World War II 
“accelerated the process of decolonization.  The British and French 
colonial empires collapsed by the early 1960’s and by the 1980’s 
there remained no part of the world under unwilling colonial 
domination by Europeans.”131  The Third World—a collection of 
non-aligned states—was wooed by the capitalist, democratic 
West—including the United States and Europe—and the socialist 
East—including the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
A generation of legal scholars from the newly independent 
states developed sophisticated approaches toward international 
law.132  As Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni summarize their work, 
 
127 These are obviously not the only international regimes operative in LDCs. 
They participate in, and are subject to, inter alia, human rights, the MDG, the Law 
of the Sea, and the ICC. I focus on ‘development’ and fair trade because of their 
impact and visibility. 
128 See supra note 10.  See also SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 261-262 (2011) (explaining her strategic choice to use ‘Third World’). 
129 See supra note 11. 
130 See supra note 13. 
131 BEDERMAN, supra note 2, at 5. 
132 See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION?: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1987); MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A 
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Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) “indicted 
colonial international law for legitimizing the subjugation and 
oppression of Third World peoples.”133  Some TWAIL scholars 
argued that the developed states owed the Third World 
compensation for colonialism and the benefits that the developed 
states still reaped from it.134 
In 1964, the former colonies, then newly independent states, 
formed the G-77.135  Most of these states had high hopes for the UN 
and sought to advance their claims for a fairer international 
economic system through international lawmaking.136  In 1967, 
Arvid Pardo of Malta suggested in the General Assembly that the 
deep seabed should be considered the “common heritage of 
mankind.”137  In 1970, this was formalized into the Declaration of 
Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor.138  A few 
years later, in 1974, the G-77 drafted the UN Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).139  
This initiative recognized that these states constituted seventy 
percent of the world’s population, but accounted for only thirty 
percent of the world’s income.140  In furtherance of the “[f]ull 
permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and 
all economic activities,” the NIEO affirmed the rights of the new 
sovereign states to “nationalization or transfer of ownership to its 
 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); Alejandro Alvarez, Latin America 
and International Law, 3 AM J. INT’L L. 269 (1909) (exploring how Latin American 
nations contributed to the formation of the international legal system by looking 
at three distinct periods of Latin America’s diplomatic history); see also U.N. 
LIBRARY, THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY – 
1955-1982, 1983 (containing a comprehensive list of works written by third world 
authors reflecting their countries’ attitudes toward aspects of international law). 
133 Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law 
and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 80 (2003). 
134 See R.P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems 
of International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 55-56 (1966) (discussing 
international law and the increasing involvement of Asian and African states). 
135 See supra note 11. 
136 Anghie & Chimni, supra note 133, at 81. 
137 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1446. 
138 G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (Dec. 17, 1970). 
139 G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/9556 (May 1, 1974).  For a detailed and 
systematic review and analysis of the issues, see THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1977). 
140 G.A. Res. 3201, supra note 139, art. 1. 
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nationals.”141  The G-77 viewed the NIEO as “one of the most 
important bases of economic relations between all peoples and all 
nations.”142 
Many in the First World, however, viewed the NIEO as 
confiscatory.143  Their numbers enabled the G-77 to pass 
resolutions in the General Assembly over the objections of the 
Western industrialized states.  But when Libya tried to nationalize 
Western property without adequate compensation, as the NIEO 
would have allowed, it was firmly rebuffed.144  As Anghie 
concludes, “[f]ew of the NIEO initiatives had an enduring impact 
on international law and the international economic system.”145  
While the G-77 is still operative, it now consists of 130 states, fewer 
than half (49) of which are LDCs.  This composition is reflected in 
its fragmented agenda.146 
3.2.  Multiple Regimes 
 Since decolonization, the LDCs have been an ongoing focus 
of the global North and the international system created after 
World War II.  Indeed, distinct international regimes address their 
‘development’ (or lack thereof), and their growing role in world 
trade.  While each regime explicitly seeks to “boost economic 
growth”147 or facilitate its participation in global trade, the results 
have generally been discouraging.  Rather, the development and 
 
141 Id. art. 4(e). 
142 Id. art. 7. 
143 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and 
Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 125-27 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) 
(“[F]or those who possess wealth, surrendering more of that wealth begins to look 
confiscatory”).  For an excellent overview, see Note on Historical Attitudes 
Concerning Expropriation, in DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1083-86. 
144 Texaco v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389 (Int’l Arbitral Trib. 1977). 
145 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (2005). 
146 See, e.g., 33rd Annual Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
Group of 77, Sept. 25, 2009, Ministerial Declaration, http://www.g77.org/doc/ 
Declaration2009.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (stating, inter alia, different 
priorities of: LDCs (¶¶ 21-22); middle-income developing countries (¶ 23); low-
income developing countries (¶ 24); countries emerging from conflict (¶ 25); and 
countries experiencing serious draught or desertification (¶ 35)). 
147 See infra note 155. 
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trade regimes have in many cases made things worse for the LDCs, 
as described below.   
3.2.1.  ‘Development’ 
The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), including the IMF148 
and World Bank,149 have a significant impact in LDCs.  As 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal explains, because of their “enormous 
resources,” the BWIs shape economic and social policy, 
development, and “even the very structure of the state.”150  Galit A. 
Sarfaty, similarly, has described how the World Bank shapes the 
domestic law of borrowing states.151  As Nobel prize-winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz notes, credit has been extended to 
borrowing states even when it has not been sought.152 
Those who met at Bretton Woods in 1944 established BWIs to 
finance reconstruction in Europe after World War II.153  In 1960, the 
International Development Association (IDA) was established 
within the World Bank to focus on the needs of the poorest 
states.154  The premise was that ‘boosting economic growth’ 
 
148 See supra note 77. 
149 See supra note 76; How We Classify Countries, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last visited Mar. 17, 
2013) (noting that the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying countries is 
gross national income per capita). 
150 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 6, at 95-96. 
151 Galit A. Sarfaty, Note, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous 
Rights Norms, 114 YALE L.J. 1791, 1796-1801 (2005). 
152 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 216 (2007). 
153 See Elizabeth A. Mandeville, United Nations Development Programme, in 5 
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 150, supra note 46, at 150-51  
(“[Following World-War II, there were] two new grand efforts in international 
cooperation and relations–the human rights movement, which sought to assure 
that these political and civil rights were globally afforded and protected, and the 
development movement, which sought to create standards of living and 
institutions of support in the development world to foster economies (and thus 
societies) in which these freedoms could be guaranteed.”).  See generally BARRY E. 
CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 483-84 (4th 
ed. 2003) (recounting the formation of the IMF and World Bank at the conference 
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 11-12 (2003) (describing the economic goals of the global 
institutions formed at the Bretton Woods conference). 
154 CARTER ET AL., supra note 153, at 486. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/1
01_STARK REVISEDDOCX (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:25 PM 
2013] FRAGMENTATION AND TRANSFORMATION 717 
 
through trade was the key to reducing ‘poverty and inequality.’155  
This was not only the premise of the BWIs, but of many private 
investors and their lawyers.  As David Stewart explains, 
  
[S]tates with little or no experience in private international 
law matters, and those that lack the necessary legal 
infrastructure to participate actively and effectively in the 
globalized economy, tend to be severely disadvantaged in 
international trade, investment, and capital markets.  One 
of the purposes of the private international law project is to 
assist them in gaining the knowledge and experience 
needed to overcome this deficiency.  In this sense, private 
international law, broadly conceived, is an important—
even essential—tool of international economic development 
and progress.156 
Other authors question this premise.  Arturo Escobar argues 
that liberal ideology has shaped development discourse for its own 
purposes, beginning with the “discovery” of poverty after World 
War II.157  As Majid Rahnema points out: 
[N]obody . . . seems to have a clear, and commonly shared, 
view of poverty. For one reason, almost all the definitions 
given to the word are woven around the concept of ‘lack’ or 
‘deficiency.’ This notion reflects only the basic relativity of 
the concept. What is necessary and to whom? And who is 
qualified to define all that? 158  
 
155 ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND 
UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 21-24 (Sherry B. Ortner et al. eds., 1995). 
156 David P. Stewart, Private International Law, the Rule of Law, and Economic 
Development, 56 VILL. L. REV. 607, 611 (2011). 
157 ESCOBAR, supra note 155, at 21. 
158 Id. at 21 (quoting MAJID RAHNEMA, GLOBAL POVERTY: A PAUPERIZING MYTH 
(1991)). See generally 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994) (containing a 
collection of essays criticizing the IMF and the World Bank’s “notion of 
progress”); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S 
EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD 13-14  
(2006) (explaining, for example, that, when agencies hand out free nets, they “are 
often diverted to the black market . . . or wind up being used as fishing nets or 
wedding veils”). 
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As Kerry Rittich explains, the Washington Consensus assumes 
“that the implementation of efficiency enhancing rules is an 
uncontentious goal, that everyone stands to gain from free trade, 
that property and contract rights are the paramount legal 
entitlements, and that rule-based regimes ‘level the playing field’ 
and ensure fairness among otherwise unequal parties.”159  This has 
been criticized as the self-serving ideology of the developed 
states.160  Bob Sutcliffe observes that the development story is 
captured in the metaphor of a journey—nation states start from 
roughly the same place, but at different times.161  Thus, the LDCs 
are today where Europe was in the fourteenth century.  For 
Sutcliffe, “[t]he form of travel is characterized by the transfer of 
labour from low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity 
industry and modern services.”162  But everyone ends up at the 
same place, with high consumption matching high productivity.  
Economic progress brings electricity, toilets, education, 
urbanization, medical services, longer lives, democracy, and 
human rights—in short, modernization. 
 
159 Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercions of Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
727, 739-40 (2003). See Death of the Washington Consensus?, WORLD ECONOMIC 
FORUM (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/death-
washington-consensus (summarizing a panel discussion at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos on the viability of the Washington Consensus given the economic 
recession).  This discussion concluded that “[t]alk of the death of the Washington 
Consensus is exaggerated, although parts of it will need revision in light of the 
global economic crisis.  The core principles of consensus - good economic 
governance, trade liberalization and fiscal discipline - remain valid . . . . [b]ut, 
given the controversy surrounding it, the Consensus may need a new name.”  Id.  
See also Kennedy, supra note 143, at 129 (observing that, under the Washington 
Consensus, “[a]n economy was now imagined as a ‘market’ in which individual 
economic actors transact with one another . . . . Government is there less to 
manage the economy than to support the market.  Moreover, there is no reason to 
think of economies in national terms.”); David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, 
Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a 
New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL 1, supra note 143 at 1, 17 (discussing critical analyses of development 
theory). 
160 See generally ESCOBAR, supra note 155; RAHNEMA, supra note 158. 
161 See Bob Sutcliffe, The Place of Development in Theories of Imperialism and 
Globalization, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW 
PARADIGM 135, 135 (Ronaldo Munck & Denis O’Hearn eds., 1999) (analogizing the 
shifting of labor from agriculture to industry and services as the “form of travel” 
in the “journey”). 
162 Id. at 135. 
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The metanarrative of development has given rise to three major 
critiques.  Each challenges one of its underlying premises.  First, 
the ’polarization critique’ argues that everyone does not end up in 
the same place.  Rather, Europe developed, and as a result, nations 
polarized into developed and underdeveloped states.  This result 
was set and unalterable by the end of the nineteenth century.  As 
Sutcliffe explains, “Underdevelopment is, like Dorian Gray’s 
portrait, development’s alter ego.”163  The underdeveloped states 
can never catch up, in part because of all of the trash—from 
environmental degradation to corrupt regimes—the developed 
states have left in their wake. 
Second, the ‘attainability critique’ is grounded in the realization 
that it is physically impossible for the whole world to reach the 
same destination and enjoy the level of consumption enjoyed by 
those in the West.  Rather, because of greenhouse gases, 
contaminants, and nonrenewable resources, development “cannot 
be generalized . . . without causing an apocalypse.”164 
Third, and finally, a broad range of ‘desirability critiques’ 
suggest that not everyone aspires to such levels of consumption.  
These critiques are diverse, ranging from those who seek spiritual, 
rather than material fulfillment, to those living off the land or off 
the grid, who seek a different kind of material fulfillment.  What 
these critiques have in common is their rejection of high 
consumption/high productivity.  They see “[rich developed states] 
full of needy, oppressed and unfulfilled people.”165  In short, even 
if it were possible for the entire world to live like Americans, many 
would rather not. 
Some critics argue that development continues the destructive 
processes of colonialism, eviscerating local cultures.166  Others 
 
163 Id. at 136 (emphasis omitted). 
164 Id. at 137.  See JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL 
OR SUCCEED 498 (2005) (discussing how our society is on a non-sustainable course, 
leading to various environmental problems). 
165 Sutcliffe, supra note 161, at 138. 
166 See, e.g., Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Introduction: Case 
Studies and Common Trends in Globalization, in GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE 
STUDIES IN REGULATIONS AND INNOVATION 9, 11 (Jane Jenson & Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos eds., 2000) (defining globalization as “the process by which a given 
local condition or entity succeeds in . . . extending its reach over the globe and, in 
doing so, develops the capacity to designate a rival social condition or entity as 
local”). 
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point out that a significant portion of aid dollars never leaves the 
developed states.167  Instead, it pays the salaries of consultants, 
bureaucrats, and technical advisors in Washington and Geneva.168 
The IMF was revamped following the April 2009 meeting of G-
20 leaders in London to address the “collapsing world 
economy.”169  Its resources were tripled to $750 billion and it was 
authorized to issue an additional $250 billion on its own.170  The 
focus, however, has been on rescue packages for Hungary, Iceland, 
Latvia, and other developed states.171  The LDCs are not its current 
priority.172  Even if they were, IMF resources amount to merely 
three percent of the world’s current account payments, in contrast 
to the more than fifty percent it controlled when it was established 
in 1944.173 
While the most recent Bank Report indicates real, even 
surprising, progress,174 the World Bank concedes that the Report 
assumes an improvement in ‘poverty’ using the $1.25 per day 
standards of the poorest ten to twenty countries.175  Nor do the data 
reflect access to healthcare, schooling or inequality within 
households, all of which disproportionately affect women.176 
 
167 See, e.g., OXFAM AMERICA, SMART DEVELOPMENT: WHY US FOREIGN AID 
DEMANDS MAJOR REFORM 22-24 (2008) (describing how the U.S. will tie its aid by 
requiring a recipient to spend some or all of its funding on American goods and 
services, sending the aid on a “round trip” back to the U.S.). 
168 Id. at 22, 24 (pointing out that the United States frequently includes 
clawback provisions in aid packages).  See also THE WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTING 
THE BANK’S GENDER MAINSTREAMING STRATEGY: FY08 ANNUAL MONITORING REPORT 
11 (2009) (“Competition for [Gender Action Plan (GAP)] funding elicits ‘new’ 
work on gender.  In the first call for proposals, 66 percent of proposals submitted 
were from Bank staff who already worked on gender issues.”). 




172 As one blogger suggests, this might require a transformation within the 
IMF, of ‘values’ (the “DNA, the assumptions, default solutions, and logic of its 
staff”) as well as institutional norms, arguably requiring a thorough house-
cleaning, including “hir[ing] a load of feminists.”  Duncan Green, IMF 2.0 or Same 
Old, Same Old - Has the Fund Really Changed Its Tune?, OXFAM BLOG (May 7, 2009, 
12:05 PM), http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=254. 
173 Gumbel, supra note 169. 
174 See supra notes 27-29. 
175 Chen & Ravillion, supra note 27, at 1. 
176 Id.  
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3.2.2.  Free Trade 
It has been argued that global trade regimes also benefit 
developed states at the expense of LDCs.177  Trade liberalization 
does not make everyone better off.  Even when it does “make the 
country as a whole better off, it results in some groups being worse 
off.”178  The rules for world trade are established through periodic 
negotiations or “rounds” of talks among the members of the WTO, 
whose agendas are set by the wealthy industrialized states.  The 
Uruguay Round, for instance, promised a “Grand Bargain” in 
which the LDCs would accept new rules on intellectual property, 
investments and services in exchange for a reduction of 
agricultural subsidies and textiles quotas in the industrialized 
states.179  In fact, however, the industrialized states benefited from 
the Grand Bargain, but sub-Saharan Africa lost $1.2 billion.180  
Industrialized countries made no concessions on agricultural 
subsidies and left textile quotas in place for ten years.181 
Eleanor Fox argues that the elimination of subsidies by the 
WTO Member States would be the single most effective and far-
reaching measure to improve human welfare in the developing 
world.  As she explains: 
The human costs of unfair trade are immense. If Africa, 
East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America were each to 
increase their share of world exports by one per cent, the 
 
177 James Gathii has recently noted that regional trade agreements are 
following suit.  James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade 
Agreements, 86 WASH. L. REV. 421 (2011).  See generally Symposium, The Human 
Element: The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on the Human Rights and the Rule of 
Law, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197 (2011) (articles describing a range of 
mostly negative effects of such agreements). 
178 STIGLITZ, supra note 152, at 68. 
179 Id. at 77. 
180 Id. 
181 The United States opened its markets to African cotton producers in 2005. 
Id. at 80-81.  But the United States does not import cotton.  Indeed, cotton 
subsidies make it the world’s largest cotton exporter and effectively makes 
competition by the LDCs impossible.  Id. at 85-86.  See also Kenneth A. Bamberger 
& Andrew T. Guzman, Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for Discriminatory 
Regulation of International Trade, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1445 (2008) (arguing that 
encouraging competition among United States and foreign companies, while 
simultaneously enforcing safety regulations, would significantly benefit U.S. 
consumers). 
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resulting gains in income could lift 128 million people out 
of poverty . . . .  If the nations of the WTO were to adopt 
one and only one human welfare measure, elimination of 
[subsidies in trade barriers] should be the measure.182 
Indeed, “[r]ich countries have cost poor countries three times 
more in trade restrictions than they give in total development 
aid.”183      
Five years after the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Uruguay Round, protesters disrupted the next round scheduled to 
begin in Seattle in 1999.  Following the debacle of the “Battle in 
Seattle,” the WTO convened in a more remote location—Doha, 
Qatar—to avoid large protests.184  Although the Doha Round was 
touted as a “development round,” again, there were few real 
concessions to the LDCs.185  A growing number of legal scholars 
 
182 Fox, supra note 17, at 211.  But see U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2007 28, U.N. Sales No. E.07.I.15 (2007), 
available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/mdg2007.pdf (noting that 
the elimination of trade barriers benefits some LDCs at the expense of others). 
183 STIGLITZ, supra note 152, at 78. 
184 See The Battle in Seattle, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 21 (describing 
how over a thousand groups had planned to swamp Seattle); Paul Reynolds, 
Eyewitness: The Battle of Seattle, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 1999, 4:07 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/547581.stm (describing the state of “civil 
emergency” in Seattle).  For a perceptive account of what was at stake, see Clyde 
Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 61-89 (2001).  Several scholars have analyzed the “Battle of 
Seattle” in the larger context of global governance.  See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, 
Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional 
Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 779 n.62, 780 n.63 
(2006) (providing resources to support the idea that street protests are a symptom 
of a more general anxiety surrounding the ability of international organizations to 
usurp the power of national states); Richard B. Bilder & Richard Falk, Recent Books 
on International Law,  96 AM. J. INT’L L. 264, 267 (2002) (reviewing SUSAN MARKS, 
THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE 
CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY (2000) and GREGORY H. FOX & BRAD R. ROTH, DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000)) (advocating that Marks should 
have included a chapter on anti-corporate globalization efforts to address 
concerns about her approach). 
185 Some argued that the collapse of the Doha Round of WTO talks precluded 
agreement on effective measures to “lift millions out of poverty, curb rich 
countries’ ruinous farm support and open markets for countless goods and 
services.” The Future of Globalisation, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 11. 
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question how effectively the WTO could support the LDCs, and 
their people, even if that was its objective.186 
3.3.  Doctrine 
3.3.1.  In the Courts 
As noted above, the prospects of global trade and investment, 
whether with the affluent OECD states or the up-and-coming 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), offer the 
most immediate—and substantial—payoff for LDCs.187  But foreign 
investors or trading partners can often protect their interests 
through a range of legal doctrines.  In American courts, for 
example, the doctrines of forum non conviens and the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity limit the access of LDCs as plaintiffs 
to American courts and make it easier to sue them here, as set out 
below. 
3.3.1.1.  Forum  Non Conveniens 
While plaintiffs may generally choose their forums, under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, American courts may grant a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss where an alternative, more 
appropriate, forum is available.  As the Supreme Court noted in 
Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,188 factors persuading a court to do so include 
“‘private interest factors’ affecting the convenience of the litigants” 
as well as “‘public interest factors’ affecting the convenience of the 
forum.”189 
Forum non conveniens is used to deny access to foreign plaintiffs 
seeking relief against western multinationals.190  This lockout 
 
186 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 
885-89 (2003) (discussing the dilemmas posed by the integration of the ILO Core 
Rights Labor Standards into the WTO); Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade 
Organization Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
347, 379-86, 401-03 (2004) (explaining some of the difficulties in negotiating 
common agreements); Elissa Alben, Note, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical 
Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1411-20 (2001) (putting 
the relationship between labor and trade in historical perspective). 
187 See supra Part 3.2.2. 
188 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
189 Id. at 241. 
190 See generally, Bi v. Union Carbide Chemicals, 984 F. 2d 582 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(affirming dismissal of the Bhopal case based on the doctrine of forum non 
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allows U.S. multinationals to avoid liberal American discovery 
rules and generous American juries.191  Following the accident at 
the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, for example, methyl 
isocyanate gas was released, killing more than 2,000 people and 
injuring as many as 200,000.192  A lawsuit brought by the Indian 
government, along with 144 private lawsuits, was consolidated in a 
complaint filed in the Southern District of New York.193 
The case was dismissed on the ground that the private, as well 
as the public factors, ‘tilted’ toward India.  The Court of Appeals 
upheld the dismissal.  Forum non conveniens enables multinationals 
to benefit from the same lax laws, limited enforcement capacity, 
and favorable exchange rates that make foreign investment in the 
developing world so profitable in the first place.194 
A few foreign courts have sought to provide alternatives.  In 
Lago Agrio, Ecuador, for example, a court recently entered a 
judgment against Chevron in the amount of $9 billion for polluting 
remote tracts of the Ecuadorean jungle.195  Before the ruling could 
 
conveniens); B.S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: REEXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES 53, 77-78 
(Susan Marks ed., 2008) (“Doctrines such as forum non conveniens have been used 
‘maximally [to] deny foreign mass disaster plaintiffs their day in their chosen 
forum.’”).  But see Wiwa v. Anderson, No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on 
forum non conveniens grounds action by son of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others against 
two European oil companies). 
191 See Sidney K. Smith, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Policy: Time 
for Congressional Intervention? 90 TEX. L. REV. 743 (2012) (urging the adoption of a 
federal standard to preempt state law in transnational cases). 
192 Mark W. Janis, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the Bhopal Case, 34 
NETH. INT’L L. REV 192 (1987).  See also Upendra Baxi, Writing About Impunity and 
Environment: The ‘Silver Jubilee’ of the Bhopal Catastrophe, 1 J. OF HUM. RTS. & THE 
ENVTL. 23 (2010), available at http://upendrabaxi.net/documents/Writing% 
20About%20Impunity%20-%20Bhopal%202009.pdf (deploring the “corporate 
colonization of human rights discourse”). 
193 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Bhopal I) (summarizing the procedural history of the case). 
194 Julia Hueckel, Comment, Rebalancing Legitimacy and Sovereignty in 
International Investment Agreements, 61 EMORY L.J. 601, 601 (2012) (arguing that 
“clearer, more rule-like provisions” in investment agreements will both improve 
legitimacy of arbitrations and better protect state sovereignty). 
195 Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Chevron is Ordered to Pay $9 Billion by 
Ecuador Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A4.  The Chevron case (originally 
against Texaco, subsumed by Chevron in 2001) has been going on for eighteen 
years.  See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012 
(“The dispute is now considered one of the nastiest legal contests in memory, a 
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be enforced, however, Chevron filed a suit in the United States 
alleging ‘conspiracy to extort.’196  At the company’s request, the 
American judge issued a temporary restraining order and, a day 
later, international arbiters ordered Ecuador to suspend the 
enforcement of any judgment.197 
3.3.1.2.  The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity 
Historically, the acts of a sovereign state could not be the basis 
for a claim in another sovereign state.  This rule was grounded, as 
Chief Justice Marshall observed in Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon,198 in the “perfect equality and absolute independence of 
sovereigns.”199 
After World War I, however, states began using their own 
ships to trade, and there was widespread debate regarding the 
ongoing utility of the rule granting them absolute immunity in 
connection with their growing commercial enterprises.200  This 
debate resulted in the Brussels Convention on the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to Immunity of State-owned Vessels,201 
adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.  Under this 
theory, foreign sovereigns engaging in commerce are subject to suit 
as if they were private individuals or multinational corporations.  
In the United States, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
has been codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 
1976.202 
The restrictive theory originally gained a foothold in the United 
States during the Cold War and the rise of state-trading 
 
spectacle almost as ugly as the pollution that prompted it.”).  The saga continues.  
Bloomberg News, Judge in Chevron Case Declines to Reject Award, N.Y. TIMES, July 
31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/business/energy-environment/ 
judge-in-chevron-case-declines-request.html?_r=0 (noting refusal of a federal 
judge to find an $18.2 billion judgment unenforceable, but leaving an injunction 
against the award in place). 
196 Romero & Krauss, supra note 195. 
197 Id. 
198 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
199 Id. at 137. 
200 See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 854-56 (tracing the development of 
the restrictive form of sovereign immunity throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century). 
201 Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199 (concluded in French). 
202 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006). 
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companies.203  LDCs are more likely than the more affluent states 
to engage in such activities.204  Many states in the developing 
world still claim absolute immunity for their state-trading 
companies205 and the “number of FSIA cases is rising every 
year.”206  As B.S. Chimni notes, the restrictive theory disadvantages 
LDCs, which, unlike private enterprises, cannot pass losses on to 
their shareholders.207 
3.3.2.  The ‘War on Terror’ 
President George W. Bush declared ‘War on Terror’ after 
September 11, 2001.208  Historically, terrorist attacks have been 
treated as crimes.209  As Mary Ellen O’Connell explains, the use of 
the term ‘war’ represents a deliberate legal strategy with important 
legal consequences.210  First, it legitimates extrajudicial killings.  
Second, it allows the U.S. military to detain ‘enemy combatants’ 
until the end of hostilities.211  Third, it is open-ended, both 
temporally and in terms of the methods devised to address it.  
President Bush declared that, “[This War] will not end until every 
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and 
 
203 See Changed Policy Concerning the Grant of Sovereign Immunity to 
Foreign Governments, in 26 Dep’t St. Bull. 969, 984 (1952) (“The Department has 
now reached the conclusion that such immunity should no longer be granted in 
certain types of cases.”).  
204 Chimni, supra note 190, at 75. 
205 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 859. 
206 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003: 
Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 20 (2004). 
207 Chimni, supra note 190, at 75. 
208 Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1301 (Sept. 11, 2001). 
209 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2d 
ed. 2009). 
210 Id. at 8. 
211 It also elevates terrorists to the status of prisoners of war under the 
Geneva Conventions.  Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of 
Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
39, 42 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).  The United States has refused to treat them as 
POWs, however, on the ground that terrorists are in fact ‘unlawful combatants,’ 
since they are members of a ‘non-state terrorist group.’  O’CONNELL, supra note 
209, at 604. 
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defeated.”212  As O’Connell observes, this goal could take some 
time.213 
The Obama Administration has repudiated the phrase ‘War on 
Terror.’214  But as Legal Adviser Harold Koh confirmed in his 
address on October 22, 2011 at the International Law Weekend, the 
United States is engaged in an “ongoing armed conflict against Al 
Qaeda.”215  As of Spring 2012, the United States was engaged in 
armed conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and 
Libya.216  Four of these states are LDCs.  The Obama 
Administration has ordered over 250 drone strikes in Pakistan 
alone since 2009, at a cost of more than 1,400 lives.217  Drone attacks 
have continued, as have unauthorized incursions on the territory 
of sovereign states, including the killing of Osama Bin Laden.218 
From the perspective of many in LDCs, the “uniqueness of the 
despicable acts of terrorism that 9/11 signifies [are] vastly 
overstated . . . [and] the U.S. or its allies have subjected third-world 
peoples to massive and long-running terror campaigns . . . .”219  
They note that 9/11 has not only been used to justify targeted 
 
212 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States 
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1348 (Sept. 24, 2001). 
213 Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War Not a War?  The Myth of the Global 
War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 536 (2006) (“This was not the ‘war 
on drugs’ or ‘war on poverty’, this was ‘World War III.’”).  
214 Michael Hirsh, One Year After Bin Laden’s Death: A New World, NAT’L J. 
(Apr. 27, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/one-
year-after-bin-laden-s-death-a-new-world-20120427 (quoting State Department 
official’s remark that “the War on Terror is over.”). 
215 As Peter Bergen recently explained, Obama has declared “war against Al 
Qaeda and its allies.”  Peter L. Bergen, Warrior in Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/opinion/sunday/president-obama-
warrior-in-chief.html?pagewanted=all.  Bergen is the author of MANHUNT:  THE 
TEN-YEAR SEARCH FOR BIN LADEN- FROM 9/11 TO ABBOTTABAD (2012). 
216 Warrior in Chief, supra note 215. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, The Third World, International Law, and the “Post 
9/11 Era”:  An Introduction, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 2-3 (2005) (noting consensus 
among the contributors to the symposium). 
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attacks, like those noted above, but also the Bush doctrine of ‘pre-
emptive’ war, including the 2003 war in Iraq.220   
As Antony Anghie observes, “[t]he debate surrounding 
[nuclear] non-proliferation has [also] now acquired a very different 
complexion . . . .”221  While the West insists that it must retain 
nuclear capacity for self-defense (in case terrorists obtain nuclear 
weapons), it seeks to limit the right of self-defense to “certain 
civilized states.”222  Anthony Carty, similarly, suggests that, the 
‘War on Terror’ is simply the most recent iteration of the U.S. 
project to “restore political control over the [global] South.”223   
This is a recurring theme in a recent symposium, Third World 
Approaches to International Law After 9/11.224  A group of 
distinguished contributors situate the Western response to 9/11 in 
a broader global context.  They note, with trepidation, that some in 
the West seem to regret the end of colonialism.  Indeed, as Anghie 
concludes, the ‘War on Terror’ has given rise to “the argument 
made by influential academics and diplomats . . . that what this 
disorderly and unstable world requires is in fact a return to an 
imperial system.”225 
 
220 See, e.g., Matthew Craven et al., ‘We Are Teachers of International Law’, 17 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 363 (2004) (explaining why European international law 
professors felt obliged to protest what Martii Koskenniemi called ‘Bush’s war.’). 
221 Antony Anghie, The War on Terror and Iraq in Historical Perspective, 43 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 45, 54 (2005). 
222 Id. at 55. 
223 Anthony Carty, Marxism and International Law: Perspectives for the American 
(Twenty-First) Century?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT, REEXAMINING 
MARXIST LEGACIES 169, 198 (Susan Marks ed., 2008).  He concludes, rather, that, 
“Marxist interpretations of imperialism [still] offer us the most convincing 
explanations as to why the violence of the United States increases by the year.”  Id.  
at 169.  But see Detlev F. Vagts, Book Reviews, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 178, 179 (2009) 
(book review) (quoting Carty, supra, at 169) (criticizing Carty’s “updated theory of 
capitalist imperialism” as “complicated and somewhat implausible”).  See 
generally, UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (including essays exploring the 
implications of U.S. hegemony in contexts including sovereign equality and the 
use of force). 
224 See Okafor, supra note 219 (presenting the overarching themes as a guest 
editor for the symposium issue); Osgoode Hall Law Journal—Special Issues, OSGOODE 
HALL LAW SCHOOL (2006), http://www.ohlj.ca/english/specissues.htm 
(providing the name and date of the symposium along with the corresponding 
journal issue and volume numbers).  
225 Anghie, supra note 221, at 65.  For a sharp and provocative analysis of the 
impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on women’s human rights in the United States, see 
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4. HOW FRAGMENTATION AFFECTS WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
LDCS 
As explained in Part 3, the fragmentation of women’s human 
rights law has produced a vast, and still expanding, array of laws 
and fora.  This expansion is a real boon for educated, middle-class 
women with access to these laws and fora, as well as for less-
educated, poorer women whom the former sometimes 
champion.226  As shown in Part 3, however, the fragmentation of 
international law has been better for those in the global North than 
for the LDCs and their nationals, who are generally outlawyered. 
Both of these effects reflect, and reinforce, the larger-scale 
fragmentation of human rights that began during the Cold War, 
when the holistic conception of rights set out in the Universal 
Declaration was rejected.227  Despite rhetoric about the 
interdependence of civil/political rights (‘negative rights’) and 
economic, social and cultural rights (‘positive rights’),228 two 
‘separate but equal’ covenants were drafted and entered into force 
in the 1970s.229  When the Cold War ended, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1990s, economic rights were forgotten.230  
 
Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and 
Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331 (2005). 
226 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 196-201 (2006) (describing MacKinnon’s work on 
behalf of Bosnian and Croat survivors).  But see Karen Engle, Feminism and Its 
(Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 778 (2005) (explaining why those championed may not always be well-served). 
227 As Philip Alston explains, the Economic Covenant was widely denounced 
in the United States as ‘socialist.’  Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 365, 366, 378 (1990). 
228 See Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/44/130, ¶ 2 (Dec. 15, 1989) (urging that states “pursue policies 
directed towards the implementation, promotion and protection of economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political rights”). 
229 See supra note 5. 
230 See, e.g., Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2008) (book review) (“[B]y the end of the Cold War, 
the old struggle between right and left over the governance of the economy and 
the redistribution of wealth within the advanced liberal democracies had yielded 
to a new pro-market consensus.”). 
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Social safety nets were abandoned and the rhetoric of ‘freedom’—
especially free markets—prevailed.231 
Now, in an era of unprecedented global inequality,232 ‘rights’ 
are generally understood as ‘civil and political rights.’  This 
fragmentation of human rights, and the virtual erasure of 
economic rights, profoundly shapes women’s human rights in 
LDCs. 
This Part first explains why the fragmentation of law that has 
been used to promote women’s rights elsewhere is less effective in 
LDCs.233  This Part then explains why women in LDCs are more 
likely than men to feel the brunt of the consequences when 
fragmentation disadvantages LDCs. 
4.1.  How Women’s Human Rights in LDCs Differ from Women’s 
Human Rights Elsewhere 
4.1.1.  A Pinched Conception of ‘Rights’ 
Most LDCs have ratified most of the major human rights 
treaties.234  As Oona Hathaway notes, however, “monitoring and 
enforcement . . . are often minimal.”235  It is left to non-
 
231 See Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic Covenant as a 
Congressional-Executive Agreement, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 133-
135 (2011) (noting historical changes in the way political administrations 
responded to international treaties). 
232 As a recent U.N. study explains, global wealth is distributed so that “the 
richest 2 percent of adult individuals own half of all global wealth . . . .” James B. 
Davies et al., World Distribution of Household Wealth, UNU-WIDER 2008, 
Discussion Paper  No. 2008/03 7 (Feb. 2008). 
233 For a provocative empirical study, showing that social rights litigation 
does more for middle and upper class groups than those at the bottom, see David 
Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189 (2012). 
234 Compare United Nations Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties. 
un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (containing a 
database searchable by participant to see which LDCs joined the international 
human rights treaties) with Least Developed Countries: Country Profiles, U.N.-
OHRLLS, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ohrlls/UNOHRLLS/new /en 
/ldc/related/62/index.html (last visited May 7, 2013) (listing the LDC member 
states of the U.N.-OHRLLS). 
235 Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L. J. 
1935, 2007 (2002) (“Monitoring and enforcement of human rights treaty obliga-
tions are often minimal, thereby making it difficult to give the lie to a country’s 
expression of commitment to the goals of a treaty.”). 
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governmental organizations (NGOs), already spread thin,236 to 
pressure states in which human rights are often perceived as a low 
priority, lacking the political urgency of assuring security (or 
‘public order’) and addressing never-ending disasters.  As Collier 
points out, moreover, few NGOs head to the LDCs where the 
‘bottom billion’ subsist, where the risks are high, and the 
likelihood of a good outcome are low.237 
To the extent that human rights are addressed in LDCs, 
moreover, they have been downsized.  Economic, social, and 
cultural rights are rarely mentioned.  Rather, as Upendra Baxi 
explains: 
[T]he paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is being steadily supplanted by a trade-related, 
market-friendly, human rights paradigm.  This . . . insists . . 
. upon the promotion and protection of the collective rights 
of global capital in ways that “justify” corporate well-being 
and dignity over that of human persons.238 
This narrow conception of human rights is especially hard on 
women in LDCs. 
Most states in the developed world, with the conspicuous 
exception of the United States, recognize basic economic and social 
rights.  These states, moreover, have the resources to assure these 
rights.  Thus, women’s rights to health care, including pre-natal 
and maternity care, and an adequate standard of living are the 
norm.  This is reflected in the long life spans and low maternal 
mortality rates taken for granted in most of the OECD states.239 
Women’s human rights cannot be realized in LDCs in the same 
ways that they may be realized in better-off countries.  Some 
 
236 Id. at 2008 (“As a consequence, the failure of a country to comply with its 
treaty obligations is, in most cases, unlikely to be revealed and examined except 
by already overtaxed NGOs.”). 
237 PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE 
FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 4 (2007) (“The World Bank has large 
offices in every major middle-income country but not a single person residing in 
the Central African Republic.”). 
238 Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 163-164 (1998). 
239 WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, at vii-viii. 
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breathtaking strides have been taken,240 and women’s rights in 
LDCs may in fact improve the lives of women as compared to the 
lives of men.  But LDCs lack the requisite infrastructure—the 
courts, lawyers, and critical mass of rights-literate women for 
whom civil and political rights are a priority—that make these 
rights so useful in better-off states. 
As recently as twenty-five years ago, for example, the UN 
noted that most women in the developing world had never heard 
of ‘women’s human rights.’241  Many women in LDCs remain 
unaware of these rights.242  This lack of awareness may be 
attributable, in part, to women’s disproportionate illiteracy.243  
Despite the proliferation of laws addressing women’s human 
rights, and fora in which such claims may be brought, few women 
in LDCs have actual access to either.  To the extent they do have 
access, moreover, it is almost exclusively in connection with civil 
and political rights, which are rarely their priority. 
Even if ‘rights’ only refer to civil and political rights, they may 
still improve the lives of women in LDCs.  States may adopt 
reforms that make them look ‘modern,’ for example, such as the 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, ratified by fifteen 
African states.244  The Protocol assures women unprecedented 
safeguards for sexual and reproductive health in a region noted for 
the “worst indicators of women’s health—particularly 
reproductive health.”245  Family law reforms, similarly, may appear 
quite progressive.  As Cynthia Bowman and other scholars have 
explained, however, even when family law is reformed in LDCs, 
 
240 Maternal mortality rates have plummeted, for example.  Grady, supra note 
118. 
241 Stark, Women’s Rights, supra note 46.  See also FIRST CEDAW IMPACT STUDY, 
supra note 31, at 18 (“[A]wareness of [CEDAW’s] potency as an instrument to 
amend domestic legislation is often limited.”). 
242 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 29, at 113-14 (describing the impact of a 
government-sponsored consciousness-raising program in India).  
243 WORLD’S WOMEN 2010, supra note 25, at viii (“[W]omen account for two 
thirds of the world’s 774 million adult illiterates a proportion that is unchanged 
over the past two decades.”). 
244 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, CAB/LEG/66.6; reprinted in Martin 
Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women. 1 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 40 (2001). 
245 D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 797-98 
(2d ed. 2009). 
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the new laws often co-exist with more traditional regimes in yet 
another example of the fragmentation of law.246  While the new law 
may formally assure equality, for example, customary regimes, 
under which all property belongs to the husband, may well 
persist.247 
Even if women cannot claim economic rights, a few may 
benefit from what Nicholas Kristof enthusiastically touts as “Do-It-
Yourself Foreign Aid.”248  In a special Women’s Empowerment Issue 
of the New York Times Magazine,249 he describes a school in 
Nepal,250 a factory in Rwanda,251 and an international organization, 
Run for Congo Women. 252  He concedes that: 
It’s fair to object that activists like Doyne are accomplishing 
results that, however noble, are minuscule.  Something like 
101 million children aren’t attending primary school 
 
246 See id. at 93-97, 206-207 (describing alternative family law regimes in South 
Africa and Kenya).  See also CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN & AKUA KUENYEHIA, WOMEN 
AND LAW IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA (2003) (exploring the interactions between 
customary family law and statutory family law in African countries and the 
effects of this dual system on women).  But see Celestine I. Nayamu, How Should 
Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender 
Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 417 (2000) (urging 
reformers to “appropriate the openings present in local cultural or religious 
traditions, while simultaneously working toward changing the larger social 
matrix of national legislation, constitutions, and administrative institutions”). 
247 BLAIR ET AL., supra note 245, at 207. 
248 Nicholas D. Kristof, The D.I.Y. Foreign-Aid Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Oct. 24, 2010, at 48, 49.  There are, of course, scores of well-intentioned and 
effective efforts to promote well-being throughout the LDCs that benefit women, 
even if they do not focus on them.  Nor are these efforts necessarily grounded in 
‘rights’ claims.  See, e.g., Michael Kimmelman, Rescued by Design, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
23, 2011, at AR1 (reviewing a show in the U.N. visitors’ lobby showcasing 
projects, from a community cooker fueled by refuse in Kibera, Kenya to floating 
community lifeboats that serve as schools, libraries, and health clinics in 
Bangladesh); Small Fixes, N.Y. TIMES (SPECIAL ISSUE), Sept. 27, 2011, at D1 
(describing “low-cost innovations that are making a big difference” from 
biodegradable toilet bags to drinking straws that filter out pathogens). See also 
Scott L. Cummings, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 711 (2012) (reviewing STONES OF HOPE:  HOW 
AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY (Lucie 
E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2012) (sharing inspiring accounts of self-help 
activity by Africans). 
249 Kristof, supra note 248. 
250 Id. at 49. 
251 Id. at 50. 
252 Id. at 51. 
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around the world, so 220 kids in Doyne’s school constitute 
the teensiest drop in the bucket. 
* * * 
All that is true ─ but it’s equally true if you happen to be 
that drop in the bucket, Doyne is transforming your life.253 
Kristof argues that free markets promote women’s human 
rights.  The strength and appeal of his argument reflects the 
strength and appeal of market rhetoric.  As Stiglitz, Rittich and 
others have shown, however, markets do far more for the 
financiers and investment banks that control them, and the states 
that support them, than for women in LDCs.254  Even in India, 
which is a major success story, there is little mobility for women at 
the bottom.255 
4.1.2.  ‘Rights’ as Claims Against the State 
It seems logical that both bottom-up projects would benefit 
from combining their efforts.  What is ‘good for women’ must be 
good for the LDCs in which they live.  If what is ‘good for women’ 
means educating women, or assuring them greater access to 
resources, this proposition is demonstrably true.  As the World 
Bank recently noted, siphoning resources to women not only 
benefits them, but their families and communities:  “A host of 
studies suggests that putting earnings in women’s hands is the 
intelligent thing to do to speed up development and the process of 
overcoming poverty.  Women usually reinvest a much higher 
portion in their families and communities than men, spreading 
wealth beyond themselves.”256  But because of the fragmentation of 
 
253 Id. 
254 See supra Part 3.2. 
255 See Lydia Polgreen, Scaling Caste Walls With Capitalism’s Ladders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at A1, A12 (“[A] Dalit entrepreneur is still much more likely 
to be a poor woman who has no choice but to start a small, low-profit margin 
business because so few other options are open to her, said Annie Namala, a 
researcher and activist who has worked on Dalit issues.  A survey completed this 
year of Dalit women entrepreneurs in Delhi and Hyderabad found that most 
made less than $100 a month from their business.  ‘These are basically survival 
enterprises,’  Ms. Namala said.”). 
256 Why Is Women’s Economic Empowerment Important for Development?, THE 
WORLD BANK,   http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/ 
womens_economic_empowerment.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) [hereinafter 
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rights described above,257 women in LDCs can only get more if 
others in LDCs get less.  ‘Rights’ can only be asserted against their 
own state; there is no ‘common heritage,’ as envisioned in the 
NIEO,258 from which women may draw, benefiting their states as 
well as themselves. 
Thus, ‘what is good for women’ may well be viewed as a threat 
to the state.  It might mean the end of a fragile coalition, for 
example.  Or it may be too costly because it might antagonize 
religious leaders.259  Conflict over already-meager resources is 
inevitable.260  Newly independent states have often sidelined 
women’s rights in the interest of national solidarity.  Women 
themselves often put national solidarity ahead of their own needs.  
This makes sense; if they can join in a revolution that will make the 
state more responsive to their needs, as the anti-colonial 
revolutions all promised forty years ago and as the anti-oligarch 
uprisings in the Middle East promise now, it is probably their best 
bet.261  If they do not put aside their own interests, moreover, 
others may do so for them.262 
 
World Bank, Women’s Economic Empowerment] (“This could be one reason why 
countries with greater gender equality tend to have lower poverty rates.”).  See 
also Educating Women Saves Children, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2010, at A7 
(citing study published in the Lancet stating that “giving young women an 
education resulted in saving the lives of more than four million children 
worldwide in 2009”); U.N. WOMEN, supra note 32 (“There is a direct link between 
increased female labour participation and [GDP] growth.”). 
257 See supra Part 4. 
258 See supra Part 3.1. 
259 This is not limited to LDCs, of course.  See, e.g., Ethan Bronner & Isabel 
Kershner, Israeli Women Core of Debate on Orthodoxy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at A1 
(describing how successive Israeli governments have made deals with an ultra-
Orthodox group that insists on the exclusion of women). 
260 See supra Part 2.3. 
261 See Hamza Hendawi, Yemen Uprising Binds Women from Many Walks of Life, 
BOSTON.COM, Nov. 5, 2011, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/ 
articles/2011/11/05/yemen_uprising_binds_women_from_many_walks_of_life/ 
(explaining how women in Yemen are fighting to keep a voice for their rights 
amid the tumult of Yemen’s landmark revolt).  But see Mona Eltahawy, Why Do 
They Hate Us?: The Real War On Women Is In The Middle East,  FOREIGN POL’Y, 
May/June 2012, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23 
/why_do_they_hate_us (noting that Yemen, where 55% of women are illiterate 
and 79% are not in the labor force, is the lowest-ranked country on the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report). 
262 See Kareem Fahim, Libya Revolt Sidelines Women, Who Led It, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/africa/20benghazi. 
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In addition, a state may claim that women’s human rights 
conflict with its own ‘culture,’ and represent a Western 
imposition.263  This response may generate a backlash against 
women.264  Charges that women are rejecting their culture may also 
spur them to form alliances with groups outside the state,265 raising 
further questions about their loyalty.  As Chandra Mohanty notes, 
the meanings of cultural expression may well change over time in 
response to such backlashes or alliances.266 
Other states rarely pressure LDCs to treat their women fairly.  
States could impose economic sanctions, such as those imposed by 
the Security Council on South Africa in connection with 
apartheid.267  Although gender apartheid has been well 
 
html?pagewanted=all (explaining how Libyan women who initiated the 
revolution have been sidelined by men who have seized leadership positions in 
the nascent government).  But see Anne Barnard, Libya’s Battle-Tested Women Hope 
Gains Last, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A1 (noting that women played a crucial 
role in the revolution and that “many women never want to go back [to 
traditional roles]”). 
263 See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 222 (“While concerns of 
cultural relativism arise with respect to human rights generally, it is striking that 
‘culture’ is much more frequently invoked in the context of women’s rights than 
in any other area.”).  See generally, Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, 
From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (2012) (proposing a “creative shift of gears” for approaching 
this issue). 
264 See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 225 (citing Arati Rao’s 
“series of questions to assess claims of culture, particularly those used to counter 
women’s claims of rights: whose culture is being invoked? what is the status of 
the interpreter? in whose name is the argument being advanced? and who are the 
primary beneficiaries of the claim?”).  But see NUSSBAUM, supra note 29, at 46-47 
(rejecting generalizations about “Indian culture,” and noting that “India is 
probably the most diverse single nation in the world.”). 
265 See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 89, at 221 (noting that, “[w]hen channels 
between the state and its domestic actors are blocked . . . NGOs bypass their state 
and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states 
from outside.”). 
266 Mohanty distinguishes, for example, between “Iranian middle-class 
women [who] veiled themselves during the 1979 revolution to indicate solidarity 
with their veiled, working class sisters, [and] contemporary Iran [where] 
mandatory Islamic laws dictate that all Iranian women wear veils.”  CHANDRA 
TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING THEORY, 
PRACTICING SOLIDARITY 34 (2003). 
267 See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25, at 267-268 (“The General 
Assembly and Security Council have denounced discrimination against women 
and girls in Afghanistan . . . . Some Western aid agencies have discontinued 
operations in Afghanistan.  With different political agendas, some states have also 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/1
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documented in many LDCs, such sanctions have never been 
considered.268  Indeed, no state refuses to have diplomatic relations 
with any other state on this ground.  No boycotts have even been 
threatened. 
Nor can the IMF and World Bank be depended upon.269  
Rather, their interventions amount to small, if not unwelcome, 
infusions of cash, whether in the form of subsidies or jobs for LDC 
nationals.  Thus, while the actual elimination of discrimination 
against women would radically transform LDCs, the international 
law of women’s human rights does not.270 
4.2.  Women in LDCs 
No one seriously questions women’s relative impoverishment, 
even among the poorest populations.  The ongoing global 
economic crisis makes them especially vulnerable.271  Violations of 
 
spoken out against the Taliban’s policies with respect to women, including India, 
Iran and the institutions of the EU.  Despite this criticism, sanctions have not been 
imposed by the Security Council . . . . It has been noted that, since 1979, the major 
role of women in Afghan politics has been as ‘symbols of legitimization for 
political groups led by men.’”). 
268 By ‘gender apartheid,’ I refer to the exclusion of women from the public 
sphere, including the denial of the right to vote.  See id., at 17 (“Indeed, the 
international focus on racial discrimination and apartheid based on race has often 
allowed sex discrimination and apartheid based on sex to go unchallenged.”). See 
generally, Rebecca J. Cook, The Elimination of Sexual Apartheid: Prospects for the 
Fourth World Conference on Women, in 5 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ISSUE PAPERS ON WORLD CONFERENCES (1995). 
269 See CIEL, supra note 82, at passim (observing that loans made by the World 
Bank and IMF tend to have a disproportionately negative impact on women and 
girls). 
270 See, e.g., Heather Cottin, The IMF Rapes the World, THE WORKER (Jul. 7, 2011, 
6:49 PM),  http://www.workers.org/2011/us/dsk_0714/ (accusing Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn of “administer[ing] a program of worldwide rape of women and 
children” through propagating IMF policies which caused poor women and 
children worldwide to become further impoverished).  See also Christine Ahn & 
Kavita Ramdas, The IMF: Violating Women Since 1945, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS 
(May 19, 2011), http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_imf_violating_women_since_ 
1945 (“IMF-mandated government cutbacks in social welfare spending have often 
been achieved by cutting public sector jobs, which disproportionately impact 
women. Women hold most of the lower-skilled public sector jobs, and they are 
often the first to be cut.  Also, as social programs like caregiving are slashed, 
women are expected to take on additional domestic responsibilities that further 
limit their access to education or other jobs.”). 
271 See World Bank, Women’s Economic Empowerment, supra note 256 (“The 
World Bank identified 33 developing countries where women and girls in poor 
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women’s human rights, moreover, often affect all women in a 
particular state, such as across-the-board lower pay for comparable 
work or lack of access to reproductive healthcare. 
There are always counter-examples.  A state’s inability to 
govern may create ‘space’ in which women can organize or take 
action.272  In Somalia, for example, Dr. Hawa Abdi has established 
a clinic, school, and food program that supports nearly 100,000 
refugees.273 
The global crisis may be easing for some,274 but even in the 
United States, the crisis continues for many.275  Europe remains 
teetering on the brink,276 as protests rise against austerity, and 
Italy, the region’s third largest economy, joins Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain as officially ‘fragile.’277  The issues rending Europe, such 
 
households are particularly vulnerable to the effects of the global economic and 
food crises.  Fifteen of these, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are likely to see a 
particularly dangerous mix for women and girls, with slowing economic growth, 
fewer girls in school, and higher levels of infant and child mortality.  The World 
Bank now projects an additional 200,000 to 400,000 infant deaths per year between 
2009 and 2015 if the crisis persists.”). 
272 See, e.g., CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 25 (describing women’s 
initiatives in South West Africa). 
273 Mohammed Ibrahim & Jeffrey Gettleman, Under Siege in War-Torn Somalia, 
a Doctor Holds Her Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A1 (indicating that Dr. Hawa 
Abdi’s hospital could house “400 beds, 3 operating theaters (still badly damaged 
from the attack), 6 doctors, 43 nurses, an 800-student school and an adult-
education center that teaches women how to cook nutritious meals and make 
clothes.”). 
274 See, e.g., Daniel Costello, The Drought Is Over (at Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/business/10comp. 
html?pagewanted=all (finding that the median pay for top executives at 200 major 
companies was $9.6 million last year). 
275 See Motoko Rich, Feeble Job Numbers Show Recovery Starting to Stall, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2011, at A1 (providing new Labor Department statistics showing an 
increase in unemployment to 9.2%). 
276 See Liz Alderman & Rachel Donadio, Debt Ratings Cut for 9 Countries Amid 
Euro Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at A1 (noting that down-graded credit 
ratings, along with ongoing problems in Greece, “underscore that even as 
Europe’s debt turmoil enters its third year, no clear solutions are yet in sight.”); 
Landon Thomas, Jr., In Euro Zone, Debt Pressure Tightens Grip, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/business/global/in-euro-zone-
debt-pressure-tightens-grip.html (describing “escalation of crisis”).  See also Keith 
Bradshier, China Output Slows Sharply; Ripples Feared, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012, at 
A1-A3 (noting that “China’s unexpected economic difficulties are starting to 
unnerve investors in world markets”). 
277 See Daniel Bases & Walter Brandimarte, Moody’s May Downgrade Italy on 
Rates, Growth Concern, REUTERS, Jun. 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/ 
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as disappearing pensions and shrinking social safety nets, remain 
unimaginable luxuries in the LDCs.  There, the economic crisis is 
grim.  As set out in the UN Resolution on World Economic Crisis:278 
Developing countries, which did not cause the global 
economic and financial crisis, are nonetheless severely 
affected by it.  The economic and social progress achieved 
during recent years, in particular on internationally agreed 
development goals, including the Millennium Development 
Goals, is now being threatened in developing countries, 
particularly least developed countries . . . . Women also face 
greater income insecurity and increased burdens of family 
care.279 
Fragmentation allows financial markets to exploit ad hoc 
arrangements and resist the ‘global economic governance’ called 
for by the UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System.280  Indeed, the G-20 
scoffs at the ineffectual calls by Miguel d’Escoto, the President of 
the General Assembly, for “new global institutions, authorities and 
advisory boards.”281  Absent any form of centralized regulation, as 
Stiglitz explains, fragmentation encourages a “‘race to the bottom,’ 
 
article/2011/06/17/us-italy-moodys-review-idUSTRE75G5AX20110617 
(describing Italy’s economic recovery as “fragile”).  Some analysts have attributed 
the dismal situation in Europe to Basel II, which allowed banks to evaluate their 
own assets.  See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair’s Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 10, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/ magazine/sheila-bairs-exit-
interview.html?pagewanted=all (“The European Banks, lacking adequate capital, 
were crushed by the financial crisis.  Big banks in places like Ireland and Iceland 
collapsed.  Germany doled out hundreds of billions of dollars to shore up its 
banks.  Even today, banks in Europe are in far worse shape than they are in the 
U.S.”).  
278 See U.N. Resolution on World Economic Crisis, supra note 26. 
279 Id. at 2. 
280 See The Commission of Experts of the President of the UN General Assembly on 
Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System: Key Perspectives, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/key_perspectives. 
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (exhorting Member States to take a collective action 
to resolve the crisis and reform the economic institutions to regulate the markets). 
281 Neil MacFarquhar, At U.N., A Sandinista’s Plan for Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/25nations.html 
(explaining that d’Escoto’s initiative breached U.N. etiquette because 
“traditionally, before any conference, the General Assembly president appoints a 
couple of ambassadors as ‘facilitators’ who consult widely and then propose a 
working document.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
01_STARK REVISEDDOCX (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:25 PM 
740 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:4 
 
with countries with lax regulation competing to attract financial 
services.”282 
The crisis is not over, of course, and its impact remains to be 
seen.  In some states, and in some sectors, women have suffered 
less than men.283  But the global economic crisis contributes to a 
longer-term, and more disturbing, trend.  A recent study by the 
Harvard School of Public Health provides a “sobering picture” of 
poor women in fifty-four poor and middle-income countries.284  
Noting that changes in average height have long been relied upon 
by researchers as a proxy for changes in the group’s standard of 
living, the study describes the decline and stagnation in average 
heights among women born in the last two decades in these 
countries, compared to their mothers and grandmothers.  For these 
women, the world is “not getting to be a better place . . . . For them, 
it’s getting worse.”285 
5. CONCLUSION 
Part 1 has described the ongoing bottom-up transformation of 
international law as a normative process and the simultaneous 
fragmentation of international law as a structural process.  It set 
out the major thesis of this Article; i.e., that the structural 
transformation of international law—fragmentation—both 
supports and undermines the normative bottom-up transformation 
of international law in the context of women’s human rights. 
Part 2 has shown how the fragmentation of international law 
has been a qualified boon for women’s human rights.  Even if 
states continue to deny women their rights, increasing numbers of 
 
282 Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Real Cure for the Global Economic Crackup, THE NATION, 
July 13, 2009, at 11. 
283 See Rosin, supra note 26 (noting the erosion of the preference for male 
children). 
284 See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Very Poor Women Are Smaller, As Are Their 
Chances at a Better Life, N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2011, at D6 (quoting the lead author of 
the Harvard study, S. V. Subramanian, and summarizing the study’s findings).  
But see RODERICK FLOUD ET AL., THE CHANGING BODY:  HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE WESTERN WORLD SINCE 1700 (2011) (describing a 
different, more comprehensive study of how technological progress has 
‘supersized’ those in the affluent West). 
285 McNeil, supra note 284, at D6. See also Jeffrey Gettleman, For Somali 
Women, Pain of Being a Spoil of War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, at A1 (noting 
increase in rapes accompanying the breakdown of the clan system). 
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women are asserting them, especially in those states that are no 
longer among the world’s poorest.  In Egypt, for example, 
thousands of women recently took to the streets to demonstrate 
against the abuse of an earlier wave of female protesters.286  At the 
same time, however, many women are worse off. 
Part 3 describes the impact of fragmentation on LDCs.  It has 
shown, first, how the LDCs have been fragmented politically.  
Second, it has explained how the fragmentation of international 
law has subjected LDCs to multiple regimes with often disastrous 
results.  Third, it has described the impact of new doctrines on 
LDCs, including the ‘War on Terror.’ 
Part 4 has shown how women in LDCs have been ill-served by 
the pinched conception of human rights since the end of the Cold 
War.  Indeed, it has pitted them against their already hard-pressed 
states, in a demoralizing zero-sum game. 
Neither the transformation nor the fragmentation of 
international law is a natural or inevitable process.  Rather, both 
result from a series of strategic legal initiatives by those who seek 
to further a broad range of often competing objectives, from 
women’s human rights287 to corporate profits to redistribution of 
resources.  International law is particularly conducive to such 
initiatives because of the lacunae discussed above;288 i.e., there are 
so few inter-governmental institutions to constrain them. 
But these initiatives rely on law.  They are impossible without 
infrastructure, including courts and honest judges.  They are 
impossible unless people are aware of their own human rights289 
and have access to skilled lawyers, capable of maneuvering 
through increasingly complex legal regimes.  They are impossible, 
often, without the resources to support sustained, high-stakes 
 
286 See David D. Kirkpatrick, March in Cairo Draws Women by Thousands, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at A1 (describing “the biggest women’s demonstration in 
modern Egyptian history, the most significant since a 1919 march against British 
colonialism inaugurated women’s activism here, and a rarity in the Arab world”). 
287 See supra Part 2. See generally, JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND 
WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006) (describing feminists’ ‘will to power’). 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
289 See supra note 241 (noting the lack of awareness of CEDAW’s potential 
uses in amending national legislation). 
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litigation.290  These are all in short supply in LDCs, especially for 
women.291  
 
290 See, e.g., Keefe, supra note 195 (describing eighteen-year lawsuit against 
Chevron). 
291 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 152, at 208 (urging legal aid for developing 
states); Seyom Brown & Vanda Felbab-Brown, Nepal, On the Brink of Collapse, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/opinion/nepal-on-
the-brink-of-collapse.html (“[M]ost institutions [are] malfunctioning and . . . 
bribery and political connection rule the day.”). 
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